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Abstract
This work addresses the problem of hiding query access patterns in privacy-
preserving range queries while guaranteeing data and query confidentiality. We
propose two methods, which are based on Private Information Retrieval (PIR) and
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) techniques, respectively. For the PIR based search op-
eration, we introduce a new scheme based on Lipmaa’s computationally-private
information retrieval (CPIR) method. We reduce the computation cost of CPIR by
reducing the number of modular exponentiation operations, employing shallow trees
and utilizing multi-exponentiation techniques. Furthermore, we improved the per-
formance of CPIR by applying parallel algorithms. For the ORAM based method,
we adapted Stefanov’s Path ORAM method to the privacy-preserving range search.
Our analyses show that, in terms of communication cost, CPIR provides better
bandwidth usage especially in large database sizes, while in computational cost,
Path ORAM based method performs better due to the negligible cost of server op-
erations. The results imply that, despite some advantageous qualitative aspects of
CPIR and its highly parallel implementation, it is still an expensive scheme in terms
of computation complexity in comparison with Path ORAM for hiding query access
patterns in privacy preserving range queries.
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MAHREMI˙YET KORUMALI ERI˙M SORGULARINDA
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O¨zet
Bu c¸alıs¸ma mahremiyet korumalı erim sorgulamalarında veri ve sorgu gizlilig˘inin
yanı sıra, sorgunun eris¸im o¨ru¨ntu¨su¨nu¨n gizlenmesi sorununu is¸lemektedir. Bu soruna
c¸o¨zu¨m olarak Mahremiyet Korumalı Bilgi Eris¸imi (PIR) ve I˙lgisiz Bellek (ORAM)
tekniklerine dayalı iki farklı yo¨ntem o¨nerilmis¸tir. PIR’e dayalı mahremiyet koru-
malı erim sorguları ic¸in Lipmaa’nın daha o¨nce sunmus¸ oldug˘u hesaba dayalı PIR
(CPIR) yo¨ntemi u¨zerinden yeni bir CPIR yo¨ntemi sunulmaktadır. O¨zgu¨n yo¨ntemin
hesaplama su¨resini du¨s¸u¨rmek amacıyla, yeni CPIR yo¨nteminde toplam modu¨ler
u¨st alma is¸lemi sayısının azaltımı, daha az derinlikli agac¸ların kullanımı ve u¨st
hesaplamaları ic¸in es¸ zamanlı c¸oklu u¨st alma algoritmalarının kullanımı o¨nerilmis¸tir.
Dahası, kos¸ut algoritmalar kullanılarak yeni CPIR yo¨nteminin hesaplama su¨releri
iyiles¸tirilmis¸tir. ORAM’a dayalı mahremiyet korumalı erim sorgulama teknig˘inde
ise Stefanov’un daha o¨nce sunmus¸ oldug˘u Path ORAM yo¨ntemi erim sorgularına
uyarlanmıs¸tır. C¸o¨zu¨mleme sonuc¸ları go¨stermektedir ki, iletis¸im maliyeti go¨z o¨nu¨nde
bulunduruldug˘unda, PIR yo¨ntemi o¨zellikle bu¨yu¨k veritabanlarında daha du¨s¸u¨k ag˘
kullanımı sag˘lamaktadır. O¨te yandan, hesaplama maliyetleri du¨s¸u¨nu¨ldu¨g˘u¨nde, sunucu
tarafındaki maliyetin go¨z ardı edilebilir olmasından dolayı ORAM temelli yo¨ntem
daha iyi sonuc¸lar sunmaktadır. Bu sonuc¸lardan yola c¸ıkarak, mahremiyet koru-
malı erim sorgularında sorgu eris¸im o¨ru¨ntu¨su¨nu¨n gizlenmesinde,nitel ac¸ıdan yarar-
ları olmasına rag˘men, hesaplama maliyetleri ac¸ısından CPIR yo¨nteminin ORAM
yo¨ntemine go¨re daha pahalı oldug˘u so¨ylenebilir.
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Introduction
While outsourcing storage of data to cloud is beneficial for data owners to reduce
the associated costs thereof, ensuring secure and private access to data becomes
the next big challenge. The threat is that a curios data holder may try to retrieve
information from the stored data, from the queries sent by the data owner or from the
results of the queries. Therefore, several approaches are proposed in the literature
to securely search over outsourced data for an item or for items in a range. One
approach considers preserving the order of plaintext [3], or the order of prefix in
plaintext [21], in ciphertext using deterministic encryption methods, known as order-
preserving encryption. Boldyreva et al. [4], [5] improve the performance of order-
preserving encryption and provides formal security definitions for the method. The
second approach is known as predicate encryption [6], or Hidden Vector Encryption
(HVE), based on public key encryption. In the setup phase of HVE, based on the
characteristics of the plaintext, a vector x is generated and the data is encrypted for
storage. When a user wants to query a range from the encrypted data, he needs to
create a query token. The token contains a query vector w which is generated for the
requested range based on the characterization rules of x vector. Thus, to search for
a range, the token should compare the corresponding elements of w and x vectors.
If they match, then the token is able to decrypt the corresponding ciphertext [31].
Another solution is utilizing special data structures used to store the encrypted data.
For example, Vimercati et al. [26] proposes a privacy-preserving range query method
on B+ trees. The method consists of three main parts. The first part involves cover
searches which hides the actual request within fake requests. The second part is
cached searches which stores some recent data in a cache on client side. The third
part performs shuﬄing on the accessed nodes of B+ tree and rewrites them to
the server. The last approach for privacy-preserving range queries is bucketization
xii
methods which partitions the data into buckets according to a predefined rule. An
early approach for bucketization, [16], uses simpler methods, such as equi-depth or
equi-width partitioning, to partition the data into buckets. According to this model,
each data item is assigned a bucket id depending on the partitioning method and
stored encrypted in the database along with its bucket id. When a query needs to
be performed, the query is first translated into the corresponding bucket id based on
the partitioning method. Then, the encrypted data items with the matching bucket
ids are retrieved from the database. The main problem of bucketization schemes
is the existence of false positives caused by retrieving the data as a bucket instead
of one by one. While the existence of false positives benefits the security of the
scheme by obfuscating the retrieved data range, it creates an overhead in terms of
performance. Hore et al., [17], [18], improve bucketization methods by introducing
algorithms for optimized buckets in terms of performance and security.
The proposed methods are generally successful in satisfying two security concerns
of privacy-preserving range queries: data confidentiality and query confidentiality.
Since almost all schemes store the data in encrypted form, the confidentiality of
data is provided trivially. The security of a query content can be achieved by its
transformation into a secure representative such as tokens [6], bucket ids [18] or fake
requests [26]. However, apart from those concerns, a good privacy-preserving range
query scheme should prevent the disclosure of query access patterns. Especially in
precise query protocols, as HVE or order preserving schemes, the observation of
query access patterns can reveal useful information about query or data [19], [10].
Although, Vimercati et al.’s B+ scheme achieves hiding the query access patterns
by using the shuﬄing method, the cryptographic primitives of the scheme are weak.
Instead, usage of Oblivious RAM (ORAM) or Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
methods can provide stronger security for range queries. ORAM and PIR methods
are proposed to enable retrieve an item from an encrypted database without leaking
any information related to the retrieved data [7], [14]. The high overheads of these
methods are an obstacle for PIR and ORAM based techniques, but, both methods
provide favorable properties for privacy-preserving range queries provided that their
performances are improved.
Indeed, recent advances in the literature such as the Path ORAM method of
xiii
Stefanov et al. [28], which is fast and easy to implement, provide almost practical
schemes in hiding query access patterns. Similarly, certain acceleration techniques
in PIR schemes [24], [30] may also result in acceptable performance results.
The aim of this thesis is to explore the feasibility of hiding access patterns in
privacy-preserving range queries. We implement two techniques, one based on the
Lipmaa’s CPIR [24] method, and the other on the Path ORAM [28] method and
compare them in terms of their communication and computation costs. For the
CPIR based technique, we propose a new computation method which improves the
performance of Lipmaa’s CPIR by reducing the total number of modular exponentia-
tion operations, introducing shallow trees using octal and hexadecimal constructions,
where internal tree nodes have 8 and 16 children, respectively, and enabling employ-
ment of simultaneous modular exponentiation operations. In addition, we present
parallel algorithms to further accelerate the computations in the CPIR technique.
The thesis starts with providing necessary preliminary information about the
utilized techniques in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 introduces the new method for CPIR
technique in detail. Then, in Chapter 3 the application of CPIR and Path ORAM
on privacy-preserving range query schemes is explained. Once the methods are
introduced, Chapter 4 presents the analysis of communication and computation
complexities both for the new CPIR scheme and for the range query schemes which
utilize CPIR and Path ORAM. Finally, the actual results of the implementations
for the new CPIR scheme and the range query schemes are provided in Chapter 5.




As it has been already mentioned, this thesis addresses the problem of hiding query
access patterns in privacy-preserving range queries. To that end, two different tech-
niques, based on CPIR and Path ORAM, respectively, are employed. This chapter
provides the necessary background information for PIR, Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
and range queries, which is necessary to follow the discussions in the subsequent
chapters. First, we start with introducing the utilized cryptographic preliminar-
ies, which are the concept of homomorphic encryption, the Damg˚ard Jurik homo-
morphic cryptosystem and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Since the
proposed CPIR method is based on the Lipmaa’s CPIR method [24], the CPIR
method and an extension on the CPIR method [30] are explained. In addition,
Lim-Lee’s multiexponentiation method, utilized for accelerating the CPIR scheme,
is presented. The chapter continues with the detailed explanations of the ORAM
and Path ORAM methods as a simple implementation of ORAM. Finally, since
the proposed CPIR based range query scheme is constructed using bucketization
technique [18], an overview of a bucketization scheme adapted to range queries is
provided.
1.1 Cryptographic Primitives
The security of the CPIR methods generally depends on the security of the under-
lying cryptosystem. The Lipmaa’s CPIR method and our new CPIR method are
based on additive homomorphism and multiple encryption. Thus, we first explain
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the concept of homomorphic encryption, then continue with Damg˚ard-Jurik cryp-
tosystem which satisfies the necessary cryptographic properties for CPIR scheme.
Finally, brief information on AES cryptosystem, which is utilized for confidentiality
of stored data in range query schemes, is provided.
1.1.1 Homomorphic Encryption
A cryptosystem is homomorphic if it allows to perform operations on encrypted data
without decrypting it. The homomorphic property enables the data owners to op-
erate on their data, which is stored on a remote server, without sharing the private
key with server. The homomorphic property of most homomorphic cryptosystems
is based on a specific operation such as addition or multiplication. RSA [2] and El-
Gamal [11] cryptosystems are examples of multiplicatively homomorphic cryptosys-
tems while Goldwasser-Micali [15], Paillier [25] and Damg˚ard-Jurik [9] cryptosystems
are representatives of additively homomorphic cryptosystems. Furthermore, there
are some homomorphic cryptosystems that can perform both addition and multipli-
cation on the ciphertext, which are known as fully homomorphic schemes [12].
1.1.2 Damg˚ard - Jurik Cryptosystem
Retrieving a file from the database using CPIR protocol requires utilizing an addi-
tively homomorphic cryptosystem. A possible candidate can be the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. However, Paillier is not a convenient scheme as it cannot accomodate
changing block sizes, which is required in CPIR schemes. An alternative is the
Damg˚ard - Jurik cryptosystem. It is a generalization of the Paillier cryptosystem,
which enables to change the block length of the scheme without losing the homo-
morphic property [9], and, thus, allows multiple encryptions.
The setting of the Damg˚ard - Jurik cryptosystem is similar to RSA that employs
the operations on a modulus N which is the product of two sufficiently large primes,
p and q. However, its security assumption differs from the RSA cryptosystem.
Rather than relying on the hardness of integer factorization, the security of the
Damg˚ard-Jurik scheme is based on the hardness of decisional composite residuosity
problem.
The key property of the Damg˚ard - Jurik cryptosystem that makes it useful for
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the CPIR protocol is the positive integer s which is used as the power of modulus
N . This value allows multiple encryptions in different levels by adjusting the block
length for the same public key. The cryptographic operations and homomorphic
properties of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem are as follows:
Key Generation:
 Choose large primes p and q, and set N as N = p · q.
 Choose an element g ∈ Z∗Ns+1 such that g = (1 +N)jx mod N s+1 with j being
an integer relatively prime to N and x ∈ H, where the group H is isomorphic
to Z∗N
 Compute λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1), and choose d such that d ≡ 1 mod N s and
d ≡ 0 mod λ.
 Public key : (N, g)
 Private key: d
Encryption:
 E(m, r) = gmrN
s
mod N s+1, where m ∈ ZN is the plaintext and r ∈ ZNs+1 is
a random number.
Decryption:
 Compute cd mod N s+1, then using the algorithm proposed in [9] find m.
Additive Homomorphic Properties:
 E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2)
 E(m)c = E(m · c)
1.1.3 Advanced Encryption Standard
The secure storage of data in a remote server is possible by guaranteeing the con-
fidentiality of data which can be provided by encryption. Advanced Encryption
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Standard (AES) is the current standard for data encryption based on Rijndael ci-
pher [1]. It is a symmetric block cipher with 128, 192 and 256 bit key sizes. The
cryptosystem is based on repetitive permutation and substitution operations. The
size of the message in AES may be larger or smaller than the block size which re-
quires an adaptation of the plaintext to the block size. To that end, the modes of
operation are utilized on AES. There are several types of modes of operation to use
on block ciphers. The modes may work in parallel blocks or may apply a feedback
mechanism such that each block depends on the result of the former method. Such
modes of operation require usage of an initialization vector (IV) for the first block
which enables to produce distinct ciphertexts for each encryption of a plaintext.
Cipher block chaining (CBC) is an example of modes which utilize feedback mech-
anism using IV. In this method each block encryption depends on the encryption
of the previously encrypted blocks. To provide data confidentiality in the proposed
privacy preserving range query schemes, we encrypted the database with AES using
CBC mode of operation in our experiments.
1.2 Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR), introduced by Chor et. al [7], is a method
which enables users to retrieve an item from a remote database without leaking
any information about the retrieved item to database server. The trivial solution
of PIR is downloading the entire data from the server and applying a local retrieve
operation. However, it is not a feasible solution considering the size of the database
and the access rights of the user. Instead, using PIR methods, an item can be re-
trieved by exchanging less data than the size of the original database. PIR can be
achieved either securing the client against computationally unbounded servers, re-
ferred as Information Theoretic PIR (itPIR); or relying the security of the protocol
on a computationally difficult problem, known as Computational PIR (CPIR). Ex-
isting CPIR schemes benefit from the security assumption of a cryptosystem as the
computationally difficult problem. For instance, The CPIR protocol of Kushilevitz
and Ostrovsky [20] is developed on the Goldwasser-Micali [15] cryptosystem which
depends on the intractability of quadratic residuosity problem. Similarly, Lipmaa
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proposed a CPIR method [24] using Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem, the security of
which is based on the decisional composite residuosity problem [9]. Since Lipmaa’s
method has a better communication complexity than other CPIR methods, we select
it as the basis of our PIR protocol for our privacy-preserving range query scheme.
1.2.1 Lipmaa’s CPIR Scheme
Lipmaa’s CPIR method, which is known as Binary Decision Diagram CPIR, or
BddCPIR, combines a non-cryptographic data structure with a cryptographic pro-
tocol [24]. Binary decision diagrams (Bdd), as the non-cryptographic data structure
of BddCPIR, enable to improve the efficiency of the scheme in terms of communi-
cation and computation complexity. On the other hand, the security of the scheme
is guaranteed by the security assumption of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem. The
cryptographic properties of Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem are explained previously.
Hence, this section continues with the definition of binary decision diagrams and
then introduces the Lipmaa’s CPIR protocol.
Binary Decision Diagrams
A binary decision diagram (Bdd) is a directed acyclic graph, whose internal nodes
have at most two outgoing edges, which are labeled as 0 or 1. Since in the Lipmaa’s
scheme Bdds always have exactly two outgoing edges, they can be considered as
binary trees, as well. For each level i of the binary tree, the jth internal node of the
current level is represented as Ri,j. The data items are stored in the leaf nodes and
represented as fx. The index x is a d-bit string that shows the route taken from the
root node to the corresponding sink node, where d is the depth of the tree. A Bdd
storing 4 files is demonstrated in Figure 1.1.
Octal and Hexadecimal Trees In this work, we use a slightly different method
based on Lipmaa’s BddCPIR, which employs octal and hexadecimal trees, instead
of binary trees due to performance reasons as explained in the subsequent sections.
In general, octal and hexadecimal trees share the same properties with binary trees,
but, the main difference is the number of children for each internal node. While










Figure 1.1: An illustration of Bdd which contains 4 files
of octal and hexadecimal trees are represented by 3d and 4d bits, repectively, where
d is the depth of the tree.
(2,1)-CPIR
(2,1)-CPIR is the base protocol of the Lipmaa’s 1-out-of-n construction, where n is
the number of data items. In this protocol, the client inputs either 0 or 1 to retrieve
one of the 2 files -f0 or f1- stored in the server without leaking information. The
flow of the protocol is as follows:
 Client generates public and private keys (pk, sk). According to the value of
input x ∈ {0, 1}, client computes the encrypted selection bit c = Epk(x) and
sends pk and c to the server.
 Server computes R = Epk(f0) · cf1−f0 and sends R to the client.
 Client decrypts R with his private key sk to find the selected file fx
Proof. Based on the homomorphic properties of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosys-
tem, we can show the correctness of the above operation as follows:
R = E(f0) · cf1−f0
= E(f0) · E(x)f1−f0
= E(f0 + x(f1 − f0)) = E(fx)
6
Generalization of (2,1)-CPIR to (n,1)-CPIR
On the basis of Lipmaa’s (2,1)-CPIR protocol, a 1-out-of-n method can be con-
structed by repeating the protocol to 2-file sub-trees in each time. The protocol
starts with the sink nodes of the tree and continues towards the root node. For
the nodes in each level of the tree, the R values are calculated and used for the
subsequent computations in the upper level of the tree. The final result is stored in
the root of the tree and the server sends the value of the root node to the client.
Different from (2,1)-CPIR, in (n,1)-CPIR protocol, the client needs to send d selec-
tion bits as x = (x0, x1, , xd−1). Furthermore, the result should be decrypted d times
to retrieve the requested file. Figure 1.2 illustrates the (n, 1)−CPIR protocol for a
4-file case based on the binary tree in Figure 1.1.
(n,1) - CPIR with 4 files
Client:
 Computes the encrypted selection bits c0 = E(x0) and c1 = E(x1) for
the two levels of the tree and send them to the server.
Server:
 For the lowest level of the tree, computes
R1,0 = E(f0) · cf1−f00
R1,1 = E(f2) · cf3−f20
 For the next level, repeats the computations using R1,0 and R1,1, instead
of files and corresponding encrypted selection bit of the level:
R2,0 = E(R1,0) · cR1,1−R1,01
 Sends R2,0 to the client.
Client:
 Applies double decryption to R2,0 to retrieve the selected file.
Figure 1.2: An example of (n,1) - CPIR for a database of 4 files
1.2.2 Improving Lipmaa’s CPIR
In [30], U¨nal and Savas¸ propose an improvement on Lipmaa’s BddCPIR which
employs a method based on octal trees. Although this form of the tree representation
does not change the asymptotic complexity, it results in faster implementation by
reducing the depth of the tree.
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To show the computations in octal tree case, the (8,1)-CPIR is exemplified below:
 Client prepares the encrypted selection bits and sends them to the server:
c0 = E(x0) c1 = E(x1) c2 = E(x2)
c0,1 = E(x0 · x1) c0,2 = E(x0 · x2) c1,2 = E(x1 · x2)
c0,1,2 = E(x0 · x1 · x2)
 Server computes:
R1,0 = E(f0) · cf1−f00 · cf2−f01 · cf4−f02
·cf3+f0−f2−f10,1 · cf5+f0−f4−f10,2 · cf6+f0−f2−f41,2
·cf7−f6−f5−f3−f0+f4+f2+f10,1,2
sends the result R1,0 to the client.
 Client decrypts R1,0 to retrieve the selected file.
1.2.3 Lim-Lee Multi-Exponentiation Algorithm
The implementation of cryptographic protocols in CPIR requires modular multipli-
cation of several exponentiations, in the form of xa11 · xa22 . . . xatt mod N s, where s
indicates the current level in the tree. As the number of modular exponentiations
increases, applying exponentiation in each term separately and then performing mul-
tiplication on them become prohibitively time consuming. An algorithm which can
perform these exponentiation operations concurrently can help reduce the total cost
of operations in CPIR. A candidate is Lim-Lee multi-exponentiation algorithm [22]
which is based on precomputation techniques of [23]. The algorithm enables to op-
erate modular exponentiation and multiplication simultaneously for multiple terms
which improves the performance up to 4 times [22]. The pseudo-code for Lim-Lee
multi-exponentiation algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
1.3 Oblivious RAM
Private Information Retrieval is not the only solution for achieving hidden retrieval
of encrypted data. Another well known method is Oblivious RAM which is based on
shuﬄing and re-encryption operations in each access of data [14]. Different from PIR,
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Algorithm 1 LIMLEE: Multi-Exponentiation Algorithm
. Precomputation
for k ← 0 to h− 1 step 1 do
for e← 0 to 2w − 1 step 1 do










for k ← 0 to h− 1 step 1 do
e←∑kw+w−1i=kw ci,t−1 · 2i−kw
Y ← Y · Yk,e
end for
for j ← t− 2 to 0 step -1 do
Y ← Y 2
for k ← 0 to h− 1 step -1 do
e←∑kw+w−1i=kw ci,j · 2i−kw




in ORAM access pattern can be observed but since the location and the encryption
of the data item changes after every access to it, the adversary cannot obtain useful
information by observing access patterns. Since operating ORAM may require a
small client storage and considerable bandwidth usage, several constructions are
proposed to achieve a practical ORAM method ( [27], [13], [8]). In 2013 Stefanov
et al. proposed a method which is claimed as the most practical ORAM scheme by
utilizing a small client storage. Thus, in our privacy preserving range query scheme
we utilize Stefanov’s ORAM method, which is explained in the following section in
detail.
1.3.1 Path ORAM
Stefanov’s ORAM method which is known as Path ORAM is a simple Oblivious
RAM based on shuﬄing and re-encryption operations by requiring a small client
storage. Path ORAM is constructed on binary tree in which a full path of the tree
is retrieved in each access. The details of the protocol is as follows:
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Server stores the data in a binary tree structure. Each node of the tree is called
a bucket. In each bucket, Z blocks of data are stored. If a bucket has less than Z
blocks, dummy blocks are added. At the beginning, all buckets are initialized with
some dummy values.
Client maintains a local stash, a small and private storage, to perform shuﬄing
and re-encryption operations on the accessed data path and a position map that
gives the current location of a data item. At the beginning of the protocol, the
stash is empty and the position map assigns data items into some random buckets.
Access Protocol for Read and Write Operations to read or write data a
client executes the following steps:
 Remap block: Client remaps the position of a data block to a new random
position.
 Read path: Client reads the path of a data block from the server according
to its value before remap operation.
 Update block: In write operations, client updates the value of data in the
block.
 Write path: Client writes the accessed path back to the tree. If the operation
is read, it only writes the original accessed path; but if it is a write operation
it may add some values from the stash to the path.
1.4 Bucketization Method for Privacy Preserving
Range Queries
In our model, to employ CPIR for range queries, we use the bucketization method
by Hore et al. [18] as the underlying range query scheme. In bucketization, a secure
index tag for each data item is generated using a predefined rule and assign it to a
bucket depending on the tag. The query response is retrieved as buckets, instead
of single data items which introduces false positives in the scheme. On one hand,
retrieving all data items as buckets is a good approach in terms of security, since,
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false positives within each bucket obfuscate the retrieved data range. On the other
hand, however, the existence of false positives creates overhead on the client side
computations, since client needs to clean the false positives to retrieve the target
data items. Hore et al. [18] optimizes the buckets such that the existence of false
positives helps to hide actual data while the overhead on client computations based
on false positives become tolerable.
The optimal performance in the bucketization method is achieved by two algo-
rithms. The first one is a greedy multi-partitioning algorithm, is introduced in [18]
(see Algorithm 2). The algorithm minimizes the number of false positives within
each bucket to maximize the performance of the scheme. It takes two inputs which
are the dataset D and the number of buckets M and returns M buckets, where the
cost of each bucket on client side is minimized. Greedy multi-partitioning algorithm
assumes each data item as a point, such that the number of its attributes determines
the dimensions of the point. To create optimal buckets, firstly, it computes the total
cost of the dataset by the following formula:





In Equation 1.1 |D| represents the number of data items. d is the dimension
of each point which is the number of attributes a data item has. Rj is the bucket
candidate which is considered as a rectangle and rj is the length of the i
th edge
of rectangle Rj which is actually the range of the bucket for the given attribute.
At the beginning, the dataset considered as a bucket and is represented as R1 in
Algorithm 2 which is the largest rectangle that contains all data items. To partition
R1 into M buckets, two data points which forms the largest sub-rectangle based on
the cost function in Equation 1.1. The rectangle is assigned as a new bucket and
using the same method the remaining dataset is distributed into buckets.
While greedy multi-partitioning algorithm maximizes the performance of the
bucketization scheme, the reduced number of false positives causes a vulnerability
in the privacy of the scheme. Therefore, a second algorithm, known as Controlled
Diffusion [18], is applied to the buckets’ contents, which aims to redistribute bucket
contents based on a pre-defined degradation factor, K. Thus, it optimizes the num-
ber of false positives within each bucket. A large K leads to an increase in false
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Algorithm 2 Greedy Multidimensional Partitioning
Input Dataset of multidimensional points D, number of buckets M
Output M buckets, Total Cost





i is the length of the ith edge of rectangle Rj*/
for j ← 2 to M do
Over all pairs of points in D, choose the pair (p1
∗, p2∗) and the cor-
responding rectangle R∗ s.t. the cost reduction cost Cost(D,⋃j−1t−1 Rt) −
[Cost(D\DR∗ ,
⋃j−1
t−1 Rt) + Cost(DR∗ , R
∗)] is maximized;
Assign points within R∗ to a new cluster Rj and recompute the minimum
bounding rectangles (MBRs) of all the affected clusters;
Make one pass on D and reassign all points to these j clusters (readjusting
MBRs if necessary) to further reduce total cost;
end for
return M clusters and the total cost of the scheme;
positives, while small values of K decrease false positives. Therefore, based on the
security and performance concerns, an optimal value for K can be determined. The
Controlled Diffusion method is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Controlled-Diffusion (D,M,K)
Input Data set D = (V, F ) , M = number of CBs (usually same as number opt
buckets), K = maximum performance-degradation factor
Output An M-Partition of the data set (i.e. M buckets)
Compute optimal buckets Bi, ...., BM using QOB algorithm;
Initialize M empty composite buckets CB1, ...., CBM ;
for each Bi do
Select di = K ∗ |Bi| ÷ fCB distinct CBs randomly, fCB = |D| ÷M
Assign elements of Bi equiprobably to the di CB
′s;
. /*(roughly |Bi| = di elements of Bi go into each CB)*/
end for
return the set of buckets CBj|j = 1, ...,M ;
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Chapter 2
A New Method for CPIR
In BddCPIR proposed by Lipmaa, one factor which dominates the computation
cost is modular exponentiation operations. Since the original method requires per-
forming many modular exponentiations, an approach which reduces the number of
exponentiation operations can improve the performance of the scheme. Also, as it
is addressed in [30], the message expansion property of the Damg˚ard - Jurik cryp-
tosystem affects the computations significantly. Considering the increase in modulus
N s+1 while proceeding to the upper levels of the tree (s indicating the level in the
tree), decreasing the depth of the tree for the same number of data items results in
reduced computation cost [30].
In response to the two dominant factors in computational complexity, we propose
an accelerated scheme for CPIR in this chapter. Firstly, a new computation method
is developed, which reduces the number of modular exponentiation operations per
node of the tree. Secondly, octal and hexadecimal trees are utilized for shallow
trees in computations. Thirdly, the Lim-Lee multi-exponentiation algorithm [22] is
applied to lower the cost of multiple modular exponentiation operations. Further-
more, similar to [30], a non-trivial, efficient parallel algorithm is proposed for the
new method. Finally, a hybrid approach for the parallel method is presented which
enables the scheme to scale to large database sizes by taking advantage of small
subtrees.
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2.1 The New CPIR using BDDs
In the Lipmaa’s CPIR protocol with binary decision diagrams, for each internal
node of the tree, 3 modular exponentiation operations must be performed. Two of
the exponentiations are needed in the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption operation and the
third is applied to the encrypted selection bit. Since, modular exponentiation is the
most expensive operation in the computations, decreasing the number of modular
exponentiation operations will improve the performance of the scheme. To that end,
we propose a new protocol which reduces the number of exponentiation operations
by one for the internal nodes and by two for the lowest level (leaf) nodes of the
binary decision diagram. In the new method, we eliminate the encryption operation
in the original method and instead utilize the complements of selection bits, which
are obtained through homomorphic computation. The next section explains the new
CPIR protocol for 1-out-of-2 construction and the following section extends it to the
1-out-of-n CPIR construction.
2.1.1 (2, 1) - CPIR
The construction of the new scheme is similar to the original CPIR method [24].
Namely, the server stores in a database two files, f0 and f1. The client can retrieve
one of the files, fx, from the server by using one selection bit x ∈ (0, 1). The rest of
the new CPIR protocol with binary decision trees works as explained in the following
steps:
 Client generates public and private keys (pk, sk). For the selection bit x, client
computes E(x) and sends the encrypted selection bit and the public key to
the server.
 Server
– first, finds the complement of the selection bit by the following formula:
C(x) = E(1) · E(x)N−1 mod N2
– Then, computes R = C(x)f0 ·E(x)f1 mod N2 and sends R to the client.
 Client decrypts R to get the file that corresponds to the selection bit.
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Proof. To show the correctness of the CPIR operation, first, we need to show
the correctness of the complement calculations based on the additive homomorphic
property of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem:
C(x) = E(1) · E(x)N−1 mod N2
= E(1) · E((N − 1) · x) mod N2
= E(1) · E(Nx− x) mod N2 which equals to E(1 +Nx− x) mod N2
Since the operations over the plaintext are in mod N , then we have Nx ≡ 0
mod N . Thus, the result is E(1 − x). Specifically, if x = 0, namely the encrypted
selection bit is E(0), then its complement is C(0) = E(1 − 0) = E(1). And con-
versely if x = 1, namely the encrypted selection bit is E(1), then its complement is
C(1) = E(1− 1) = E(0).
Now, we can prove the correctness of CPIR operation:
R = C(x)f0 · E(x)f1 mod N2
= E(1− x)f0 · E(x)f1 mod N2
= E(f0 − x · f0) · E(x · f1) mod N2
= E(f0 − x · f0 + x · f1) mod N2
= E(f0 − x · (f0 + f1)) mod N2
Consequently, if x = 0, then R = E(f0 − 0 · (f0 + f1)) = E(f0) mod N2. Then, the
decryption of R gives f0 for the selection bit x = 0.
Similarly, if x = 0, then R = E(f0 − 1 · (f0 + f1)) = E(f1) mod N2. Finally,
decrypting R results in f1 for the selection bit x = 1.
In the above calculation, C(x) = E(1) · E(x)N−1 mod N2 requires two modu-
lar exponentiation operations, i.e. one exponentiation for the encryption of 1 and
one exponentiation for the exponent of the encrypted selection bit. However, we
can rewrite the equation as C(x) = g1 · rN1 · gx·(N−1) · rN ·(N−1)2 mod N2, which
is actually equivalent to C(x) = g1−x · rN mod N2. Therefore, we obtain the
following formula to compute the homomorphic complement of the selection bit
C(x) = g · E(x)N−1 mod N2.
Now, we can derive the following formula to compute the value of R
R = C(x)f0 · E(x)f1 mod N2
= (g · E(x)N−1)f0 · E(x)f1 mod N2
= gf0 · E(x)(N−1)·f0 · E(x)f1 mod N2
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= gf0 · E(x)N ·f0−f0+f1 mod N2
= gf0 · E(x)f1−f0 mod N2
The server has already known the files and g. Therefore, the value of gf0 can be
pre-computed and stored on server side, which means the CPIR operation can be
handled by only one exponentiation operation for binary decision diagrams.
2.1.2 (n, 1) - CPIR
The new method can be extended to (n,1)-CPIR by using (2,1)-CPIR for each
internal node of the tree. Similar to the original CPIR method, it will start from
the sink nodes and will continue up to the root node by repeating the operations.
The database consists of n files which are represented as (f0, f1, f2, · · · , fn−1). Since
the depth of the tree is greater than 1, now, the client needs to send a selection bit
for each level of the tree. Therefore, to retrieve a file, fx, the client should prepare
the encryptions for the selection bits (x0, x1, · · · , xd−1), where d is the depth of the
tree, i.e.i d = dlog(n)e. Once he receives the response from the server, the client
needs to decrypt it d times. An example (n,1)-CPIR scheme for a database of 4 files
is provided as follows:
 Client:
– Generates public and private keys.
– Computes encrypted selection bits
E(x0) = g
x0 · rN mod N2
E(x1) = g
x1 · rN2 mod N3
for each level of the tree and sends them to the server.
 Server:
– Computes the complements of the encrypted selection bits for each level
of the tree:
C(x0) = E(1) · E(x)N−1 mod N2
C(x1) = E
(2)(1) · E(x)N2−1 mod N3
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– Computes Ri,j values for the lowest level of the tree:
R1,0 = C(x0)
f0 · E(x0)f1 mod N2
R1,1 = C(x0)
f2 · E(x0)f3 mod N2
– Continues to the computations for the next level:
R2,0 = C(x1)
R1,0 · E(2)(x1)R1,1 mod N3
– Sends R2,0 to the client.
 Client:
– Apply double decryption to R2,0 to retrieve the selected file.
Proof. The correctness of the method can be showed by the following operations:
R2,0 = C(x1)
R1,0 · E(2)(x1)R1,1 mod N3
We know that C(xi) = E(1− xi), then:
R2,0 = E
(2)(E(1− x0)f0 · E(x0)f1 · (1− x1)) · E(E(1− x0)f2 · E(x0)f3 · x1)
= E(2)(E(f0+x0 ·(f1−f0))+x1 ·(E(f2+x0 ·(f3−f2))−E(f0+x0 ·(f1−f0)))
Applying double encryption on the resulting R2,0 based on the value of x1 and
x0 gives the requested file fx.
In the above formulation, the superscript of E(2)(x1) represents the value of s





Similar to the (2,1)-CPIR method in the previous section, we can apply an
optimization to reduce the cost of exponentiation operations caused by complement
operations. For the lowest level of the tree, using the precomputed gfi values for
i = 0, 2, 4, . . ., Ri,js are computed as follows:
R1,0 = g
f0 · E(x0)f1−f0 mod N2
R1,1 = g
f2 · E(x0)f3−f2 mod N2
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Although, the precomputation techniques is utilized for the sink nodes, it is not
possible for the internal nodes. The reason is that the value of R2,0 depends on
the value of encrypted selection bits which are not known by the server before-
hand. However, eliminating the extra computations for complement operations is
still possible by the following optimizations:
R2,0 = C(x1)
R1,0 · E(x1)R1,1 mod N3
= (g · E(x1)N2−1)R1,0 · E(x1)R1,1 mod N3
= gR1,0 · E(x1)(N2−1)·R1,0 · E(x1)R1,1 mod N3
= gR1,0 · E(x1)N2·R1,0−R1,0+R1,1 mod N3
= gR1,0 · E(x1)R1,1−R1,0 mod N3.
In summary, while the original scheme by Lipmaa requires three modular multipli-
cation for the same computation, the new technique requires only two.
2.2 Implementing the New CPIR on Octal Trees
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, another factor that affects the per-
formance of the CPIR scheme is the expansion of message size in each level of tree
due to the construction of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem. Therefore, similar to
the method proposed in [30], the performance of the new method can be improved
with an octal tree implementation since it reduces the depth of the tree. The next
sections explain the CPIR method for octal trees first for 1-out-of-8 construction
and then, generalizes for 1-out-of-n case.
2.2.1 (8,1)-CPIR for Octal Trees
In 1-out-of-8 construction of CPIR for octal trees, the server stores 8 files represented
as (f0, f1, · · · , f7) in a database. The client retrieves one file fx from the database,
where x corresponds to the selection bits. The operations of octal tree implementa-
tion differs from the original BddCPIR in the preparation of the encrypted selection
bits, since each node has 8 children instead of 2. The children of a node can be
represented by 3 bits as 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111.
At the beginning, the client prepares the encrypted selection bits for 7 of the
children and sends them to the server:
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e(0,0) = E(x¯2x¯1x¯0), e(0,1) = E(x¯2x¯1x0), e(0,2) = E(x¯2x1x¯0)
e(0,3) = E(x¯2x1x0), e(0,4) = E(x2x¯1x¯0), e(0,5) = E(x2x¯1x0)
e(0,6) = E(x2x1x¯0)
After receiving the encrypted selection bits, the server performs the complement
operation to find the encrypted selection bit for the remaining child f7:
E0 = e(0,0) · e(0,1) · e(0,2) · e(0,3) · e(0,4) · e(0,5) · e(0,6) mod N2
C0 = E(1) · EN−10 mod N2
Then, server computes R1,0:
R1,0 = e
f0
(0,0) · ef1(0,1) · ef2(0,2) · ef3(0,3) · ef4(0,4) · ef5(0,5) · ef6(0,6) · Cf70 and sends the result R1,0
to the client. The client decrypts R1,0 to retrieve the selected file.
The optimization of the complement operations which is proposed for binary




(0,0) · ef1(0,1) · ef2(0,2) · ef3(0,3) · ef4(0,4) · ef5(0,5) · ef6(0,6) · Cf70
= ef0(0,0) · ef1(0,1) · ef2(0,2) · ef3(0,3) · ef4(0,4) · ef5(0,5) · ef6(0,6) · g · E0N−1
f7
= ef0(0,0) · ef1(0,1) · ef2(0,2) · ef3(0,3) · ef4(0,4) · ef5(0,5) · ef6(0,6)·
[g · (e(0,0) · e(0,1) · e(0,2) · e(0,3) · e(0,4) · e(0,5) · e(0,6))N−1]f7
= e
f0+(N−1)·f7




= ef0−f7(0,0) · ef1−f7(0,1) · ef2−f7(0,2) · ef3−f7(0,3) · ef4−f7(0,4) · ef5−f7(0,5) · ef6−f7(0,6) · gf7
The new method for complement computations enables to reduce the number of
exponentiation operations to 7 for the sink nodes of octal trees by utilizing precom-
puted values of gfi .
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2.2.2 (n,1)-CPIR for Octal Trees
Now we can generalize the new CPIR method with octal trees to n files case, where
n = 8d. Deriving from the preparation of the selection bits in 8 files case, a general
formula can be developed to prepare 7 selection bits for each level of the tree,
s = 1, ..., d:
e(s−1,0) = E(x¯3s−1x¯3s−2x¯3s−3), e(s−1,1) = E(x¯3s−1x¯3s−2x3s−3),
e(s−1,2) = E(x¯3s−1x3s−2x¯3s−3), e(s−1,3) = E(x¯3s−1x3s−2x3s−3),
e(s−1,4) = E(x3s−1x¯3s−2x¯3s−3), e(s−1,5) = E(x3s−1x¯3s−2x3s−3),
e(s−1,6) = E(x3s−1x3s−2x¯3s−3)
The operations of the server, including the computation of the complement bit for
each level of the tree, are explained in Algorithm 4 in detail. The algorithm includes
the optimizations for the complement operations such that seven and eight modular
exponentiation operations are performed for the sink nodes and the internal nodes,
respectively.
2.3 Implementing the New CPIR on Hexadecimal
Trees
Considering the bandwidth usage, the depth of the tree for CPIR can be further
decreased by using hexadecimal trees. The method is similar to binary and octal tree
implementations except for the number of selection bits per level. 16 children of a
node are represented with 4 bits, thus, for each level, 15 encrypted selection bits are
prepared by client and the 16th bit is calculated on the server side by applying the
homomorphic complement operation. The methods for 1-out-of-16 and 1-out-of-n
CPIR on hexadecimal trees are explained in the following sections, respectively.
2.3.1 (16,1)-CPIR for Hexadecimal Trees
In (16,1)-CPIR method with hexadecimal trees, the database has 16 files, which are
represented as (f0, f1, · · · , f15). To request the file fx from the server, the client
prepares the encrypted selection bits x, where x = (x3x2x1x0), as described below:
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Algorithm 4 OCTO-SERIAL: Server computations of the new (n,1)-CPIR scheme
for the octal tree
Input E = {e0,0, . . . , ed−1,6} where in es,i s = 1 · · · d, i = 0 · · · 6 and F =
{f0, . . . , f8d−1}
Output Rd,0
for i← 0 to 8d − 1 do
R0,i ← fi
end for
for s← 1 to d do
. Utilize precomputations in the sink nodes
if s = 1 then
for j ← 0 to 8d−s − 1 do
for k ← 0 to 6 do
tk ← Rs−1,8j+k −Rs−1,8j+7
end for
Rs,j = e(s−1,0) t0 · e(s−1,1) t1 · e(s−1,2) t2 · e(s−1,3) t3 · e(s−1,4) t4
·e(s−1,5) t5 · e(s−1,6) t6 · gRs−1,8j+7
end for
. Computations for internal nodes
else
for j ← 0 to 8d−s − 1 do
for k ← 0 to 7 do
if k 6= 7 then





Rs,j = e(s−1,0) t0 · e(s−1,1) t1 · e(s−1,2) t2 · e(s−1,3) t3 · e(s−1,4) t4






e(0,0) = E(x¯3x¯2x¯1x¯0), e(0,1) = E(x¯3x¯2x¯1x0), e(0,2) = E(x¯3x¯2x1x¯0),
e(0,3) = E(x¯3x¯2x1x0), e(0,4) = E(x¯3x2x¯1x¯0), e(0,5) = E(x¯3x2x¯1x0),
e(0,6) = E(x¯3x2x1x¯0), e(0,7) = E(x¯3x2x1x0), e(0,8) = E(x3x¯2x¯1x¯0),
e(0,9) = E(x3x¯2x¯1x0), e(0,10) = E(x3x¯2x1x¯0), e(0,11) = E(x3x¯2x1x0),
e(0,12) = E(x3x2x¯1x¯0), e(0,13) = E(x3x2x¯1x0), e(0,14) = E(x3x2x1x¯0)
The server receives the encrypted selection bits and calculates the complement
of the product of the selection bits as the 16th selection bit.
E0 = e(0,0) · e(0,1) · e(0,2) · e(0,3) · e(0,4) · e(0,5) · e(0,6) · e(0,7) · e(0,8) · e(0,9) · e(0,10) · e(0,11) ·
e(0,12) · e(0,13) · e(0,14) mod N2
C0 = E(1) · EN−10 mod N2
Later, the server performs the CPIR operation and computes R1,0:
R1,0 = e
f0
(0,0) · ef1(0,1) · ef2(0,2) · ef3(0,3) · ef4(0,4) · ef5(0,5) · ef6(0,6) · ef7(0,7) · ef8(0,8) · ef9(0,9) · ef10(0,10) · ef11(0,11) ·
ef12(0,12) · ef13(0,13) · ef14(0,14) · Cf150
R1,0 is sent to the client, which decrypted to retrieve the selected file.
Similar to the octal tree implementation, the computation cost of the complement
operations can be eliminated in hexadecimal trees. The method is the same as the




(0,0) · ef1−f15(0,1) · ef2−f15(0,2) · ef3−f15(0,3) · ef4−f15(0,4) · ef5−f15(0,5) · ef6−f15(0,6) · ef7−f15(0,7) · ef8−f15(0,8) ·
ef9−f15(0,9) · ef10−f15(0,10) · ef11−f15(0,11) · ef12−f15(0,12) · ef13−f15(0,13) · ef14−f15(0,14) · gf15
2.3.2 (n,1)-CPIR for Hexadecimal Trees
In the general form of the new CPIR with hexadecimal trees, the database consists of
n files, where n = 16d. The aim is to retrieve file fx out of n files. The computation
of the encrypted selection bits is formulated as below:
e(s−1,0) = E(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4), e(s−1,1) = E(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4),
e(s−1,2) = E(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4), e(s−1,3) = E(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x4s−4),
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e(s−1,4) = E(x¯4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4), e(s−1,5) = E(x¯4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4),
e(s−1,6) = E(x¯4s−1x4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4), e(s−1,7) = E(x¯4s−1x4s−2x4s−3x4s−4),
e(s−1,8) = E(x4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4), e(s−1,9) = E(x4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4),
e(s−1,10) = E(x4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4), e(s−1,11) = E(x4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x0),
e(s−1,12) = E(x4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4), e(s−1,13) = E(x4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4),
e(s−1,14) = E(x4s−1x4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4)
The server computations are similar to the general algorithm for the octal tree
case (i.e., Algorithm 4) and are explained in Algorithm 5.
2.4 Utilizing Lim-Lee Multi-Exponentiation Method
to Accelerate The New CPIR
The proposed method achieves to reduce the number of modular exponentiation
operations and improves the performance of the CPIR. The current version of the
protocol requires multiplication of 8 exponentiations for octal trees and multiplica-
tion of 16 exponentiations for hexadecimal trees per internal node, as it is explained
in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, respectively. In this section, we propose a new method
to reduce the cost of multiple exponentiation operations. To that end, the Lim-Lee’s
multi-exponentiation algorithm [22] is utilized. The algorithm allows simultaneous






1 ·ax22 · · · axtt
using pre-computation techniques and outputs the multiplication of exponentiations.
In this method, the operations on the client side are not affected, only the server
computations are updated. Algorithm 6 illustrates the server computations by em-
ploying the Lim-Lee technique on the new CPIR with hexadecimal trees. In the
previous sections, for octal and hexadecimal trees the cost of the homomorphic
complement bit computations is reduced by some optimizations techniques. These
techniques can be applied in the new CPIR with Lim-Lee method, as well. The
Lim-Lee algorithm requires a block of t modular exponentiations, where t equals 8
for octal trees and 16 for hexadecimal trees. Therefore, the optimization for the sink
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Algorithm 5 HEX-SERIAL: Server computations of the new (n,1)-CPIR scheme
for the hexadecimal tree
Input E = {e0,0, . . . , ed−1,14} where in es,i s = 1 · · · d, i = 0 · · · 14 and F =
{f0, . . . , f16d−1}
Output Rd,0
for i← 0 to 16d − 1 do
R0,i ← fi
end for
for s← 1 to d do
. Utilize precomputations in the sink nodes
if s = 1 then
for j ← 0 to 16d−s − 1 do
for k ← 0 to 14 do do
tk ← Rs−1,16j+k −Rs−1,16j+15
end for
Rs,j = e(s−1,0) t0 · e(s−1,1) t1 · e(s−1,2) t2 · e(s−1,3) t3 · e(s−1,4) t4 · e(s−1,5) t5
·e(s−1,6) t6 · e(s−1,7) t7 · e(s−1,8) t8 · e(s−1,9) t9 · e(s−1,10) t10
·e(s−1,11) t11 · e(s−1,12) t12 · e(s−1,13) t13 · e(s−1,14) t14 · gRs−1,16j+15
end for
. Computations for internal nodes
else
for j ← 0 to 16d−s − 1 do
for k ← 0 to 15 do do
if k 6= 15 then





Rs,j = e(s−1,0) t0 · e(s−1,1) t1 · e(s−1,2) t2 · e(s−1,3) t3 · e(s−1,4) t4 · e(s−1,5) t5
·e(s−1,6) t6 · e(s−1,7) t7 · e(s−1,8) t8 · e(s−1,9) t9 · e(s−1,10) t10






level, which reduces the number of exponentiation operations to 7 or 15 for octal
and hexadecimal trees, respectively, does not work in Lim-Lee method.
Algorithm 6 Server computation for the new (n,1)-CPIR scheme for hexadecimal
trees using Lim-Lee multi-exponentiation technique
Input E = {e0,0, . . . , ed−1,14} where in es,i s = 1 · · · d, i = 0 · · · 14 and F =
{f0, . . . , f16d−1}
Output Rd,0
for i← 0 to 16d − 1 do
R0,i ← fi
end for
for s← 1 to d do
for j ← 0 to 16d−s − 1 do
for k ← 0 to 15 do do
if k 6= 15 then











2.5 A Parallel Implementation for the New CPIR
The CPIR method is suitable for parallel implementations since it has several re-
peating operations which are not dependent on each other. An efficient parallel al-
gorithm for the CPIR on binary and octal trees is proposed by U¨nal and Savas¸ [30].
In this section, we adapt the proposed algorithm to the new CPIR method for the
server operations on octal and hexadecimal trees. Before that, a brief explanation
for client side parallelization is provided.
2.5.1 Client Side Parallel Implementation
The client is responsible for two main operations: encrypting the selection bits and
decrypting the server response. In the decryption of a single response, parallelism
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cannot be utilized, since each operation is dependent on the previous one. On the
other hand, parallelism is applicable on encrypting the selection bits. Algorithm 7
and Algorithm 8 present the parallelization of encryption operations for octal and
hexadecimal trees, respectively.
Algorithm 7 Parallel client side encryptions for the new CPIR on octal trees
Input x = (x3d−1x3d−2 . . . x0), pk
Output E
1: for s← 1 to d in parallel do
2: e(s−1,0) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x¯3s−2x¯3s−3)
3: e(s−1,1) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x¯3s−2x3s−3)
4: e(s−1,2) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x3s−2x¯3s−3)
5: e(s−1,3) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x3s−2x3s−3)
6: e(s−1,4) ← E(s)(x3s−1x¯3s−2x¯3s−3)
7: e(s−1,5) ← E(s)(x3s−1x¯3s−2x3s−3)
8: e(s−1,6) ← E(s)(x3s−1x3s−2x¯3s−3)
9: end parallel for
10: return E
2.5.2 Server Side Parallel Implementation
The private information retrieval operation on server side requires processing of
each data item in the database. Thus, applying parallelism can allow significant
improvements on the performance of the method. The parallel algorithm in [30]
achieves parallelism by dividing the main tree into subtrees, numbers of which are
equal to the number of cores. The computations within each sub-tree are performed
in serial. Once the cores finish the computations in subtrees, the PIR operations
in the remaining (upper) part of the tree are distributed on the available cores in
a straightforward manner to utilize parallelizm. The parallel algorithm can be em-
ployed for the new CPIR method using both octal and hexadecimal trees including
the implementation of the Lim-Lee multi-exponentation method. Parallel server
computations for the octal tree case are described in Algorithm 9.
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Algorithm 8 Parallel client side encryptions for the new CPIR on hexadecimal
trees
Input x = (x4d−1x4d−2 . . . x0), pk
Output E
1: for s← 1 to d in parallel do
2: e(s−1,0) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4)
3: e(s−1,1) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4)
4: e(s−1,2) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4)
5: c(s−1,3) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x4s−4)
6: e(s−1,4) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4)
7: e(s−1,5) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4)
8: e(s−1,6) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4)
9: e(s−1,7) ← E(s)(x¯4s−1x4s−2x4s−3x4s−4)
10: e(s−1,8) ← E(s)(x4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4)
11: e(s−1,9) ← E(s)(x4s−1x¯4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4)
12: e(s−1,10) ← E(s)(x4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4)
13: e(s−1,11) ← E(s)(x4s−1x¯4s−2x4s−3x4s−4)
14: e(s−1,12) ← E(s)(x4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x¯4s−4)
15: e(s−1,13) ← E(s)(x4s−1x4s−2x¯4s−3x4s−4)
16: e(s−1,14) ← E(s)(x4s−1x4s−2x4s−3x¯4s−4)
17: end parallel for
18: return E
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Algorithm 9 OCTO-PARALLEL: Parallel server computations for the new CPIR
on octal trees
Input E = {e0,0, . . . , ed−1,14} where in es,i s = 1 · · · d, i = 0 · · · 6, F =
{f0, . . . , f8d−1} , 2κ: number of cores, κ < d
Output Rd,0
1: α = log8 2
κ , λ = 8α , γ = λ/2κ
2: for p← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
3: for y ← 1 to γ − 1 do
4: for i← 1 to 8d − 1/λ do
5: R0,i = fp·γ·(8d−1/λ)+y·(8d−1/λ)+i
6: end for
7: for s← 1 to d− α do
8: if s = 1 then
9: for j ← 0 to 8d−λ−s − 1 do
10: for k ← 0 to 6 do
11: tk ← Rs−1,8j+k −Rs−1,8j+7
12: end for
13: Rs,j = e(s−1,0) t0 · e(s−1,1) t1 · e(s−1,2) t2 · e(s−1,3) t3 · e(s−1,4) t4
·e(s−1,5) t5 · e(s−1,6) t6 · gRs−1,8j+7
14: end for
15: else
16: for j ← 0 to 8d−λ−s − 1 do
17: for k ← 0 to 7 do do
18: if k 6= 7 then
19: tk ← Rs−1,8j+k −Rs−1,8j+7
20: else
21: tk ← Rs−1,8j+7
22: end if
23: end for
24: Rs,j = e(s−1,0) t0 · e(s−1,1) t1 · e(s−1,2) t2 · e(s−1,3) t3 · e(s−1,4) t4





29: end parallel for
. cores sync and continue with the rest of the tree concurrently
30: for s← d− α + 1 to d do
31: for j ← 0 to 8d−s − 1 in parallel do
32: for k ← 0 to 7 do
33: tk ← Rs−1,8j+k −Rs−1,8j+7
34: end for
35: Rs,j = e(s−1,0) t0 · e(s−1,1) t1 · e(s−1,2) t2 · e(s−1,3) t3·
e(s−1,4) t4 · e(s−1,5) t5 · e(s−1,6) t6 · g t7




2.6 A Scalable Approach for The Parallel Imple-
mentation
Reducing the number of exponentiation operations, utilizing shallow trees and ex-
ploiting parallelism improve the performance of CPIR significantly. However, for
large database sizes, the cost of computations are still high due to increase in the
size of the modulus in the Damg˚ard-Jurik algorithm. In [30], a scalable method is
proposed to overcome the performance issues of large database sizes. In this method,
the database is maintained as a set of several reasonable-sized subtrees. Apart from
the selection bits for the requested file, the client needs to send additional bits for
subtree selection. The main concern is that the number of subtrees should be de-
termined carefully, so that the bandwidth usage should not be adversely affected by
large amount of subtrees.
Algorithm 10 demonstrates generation of the subtree selection bits and the regu-
lar selection bits for octal tree implementation. The size of the database is n = 2m.
The number of the subtrees, µ = 2m−3l, and the size of each subtree 8l are pre-
determined values between the server and the client. The selection bits for the
subtrees are represented by ς, and the regular selection bits for file operations rep-
resented by the set of E .
After the server retrieves the selection bits, first it employs the subtree selection
bits on the trees to collapse them into one subtree, as it is shown in Algorithm 11
from step 1 to 10. In step 11 of the algorithm, the retrieval operation for the
requested file is operated on a single subtree using Algorithm 9 . The important point
is that after collapsing subtrees, the modulus of the regular retrieval computations
start from N3 instead of N2.
In Algorithm 11, the subtree collapsing operation requires multiple modular
exponentiation and multiplication operations repeatedly. Therefore, using the Lim-
Lee’s multi-exponentiation algorithm, the performance of the scalable method can
be improved. Algorithm 12 shows the scalable method which utilizes the Lim-Lee
multi-exponentiation algorithm.
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Algorithm 10 Client-side computation the scalable new CPIR on octal tree
Input m, l, and x = xl−1 . . . x1, x0
Output E = {e0,0, . . . , el,6} where in es,i s = 1 · · · l, i = 0 · · · 6 and {ς0, . . . , ς23d−3l−1}
1: µ← 23d−3l
2: ζ ← x3d−1, . . . , xl
3: for i← 0 to µ− 1 do
4: if i 6= ζ then
5: ςi ← E(0)
6: else
7: ςi ← E(1)
8: end if
9: end for
10: for s← 1 to l do
11: e(s−1,0) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x¯3s−2x¯3s−3)
12: e(s−1,1) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x¯3s−2x3s−3)
13: e(s−1,2) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x3s−2x¯3s−3)
14: e(s−1,3) ← E(s)(x¯3s−1x3s−2x3s−3)
15: e(s−1,4) ← E(s)(x3s−1x¯3s−2x¯3s−3)
16: e(s−1,5) ← E(s)(x3s−1x¯3s−2x3s−3)
17: e(s−1,6) ← E(s)(x3s−1x3s−2x¯3s−3)
18: end for
19: return {e0,0, . . . , el−1,7} and {ς0, . . . , ςµ−1}
Algorithm 11 Server-side computation the scalable new CPIR on octal trees
Input m, E = {e0,0, . . . , el,6} where in es,i s = 1 · · · l, i = 0 · · · 6 , F =
{f0, . . . , f23d−1}, {ς0, . . . , ς23d−3l}, l and κ < l
Output Rl,0
. Collapse the subtrees into one
1: µ = 23d−3l
2: γ = 23l−κ
3: for p← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
4: for i← 0 to γ − 1 do
5: for k ← 0 to µ− 1 do












10: end parallel for
. Parallel CPIR computation for the remaining subtree
11: Rl,0 = OCTO − PARALLEL(E , R)
12: return Rl,0
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Algorithm 12 Server-side computation the scalable new CPIR on octal trees using
LimLee Algorithm
Input m, E = {e0,0, . . . , el,6} where in es,i s = 1 · · · l, i = 0 · · · 6 , F =
{f0, . . . , f23d−1}, {ς0, . . . , ς23d−3l}, l and κ < l
Output Rl,0
. Collapse the subtrees into one
1: µ = 23d−3l
2: γ = 23l−κ
3: for p← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
4: for i← 0 to γ − 1 do
5: for k ← 0 to (µ/8)− 1 do
6: for x← 0 to 7 do
7: bx ← ς8k+x
8: ex ← fi+pγ+(8k+x)23l
9: end for








14: end parallel for
. Parallel CPIR computation for the remaining subtree




Privacy Preserving Range Queries
using PIR and ORAM
As stated previously, preventing the disclosure of query access patterns is possible
by employing ORAM and PIR techniques. So far, we introduced a new method for
PIR, based on Lipmaa’s CPIR scheme, which enables to improve the performance of
CPIR significantly. Further, we present a simple and fast method for ORAM which
is known as Path ORAM [28] . Depending on these two techniques, in this chapter
we develop two different methods for privacy preserving range queries. In the rest
of the chapter, first the range query protocol based on CPIR is explained. Then, it
continues with the explanation of the Path ORAM based range query protocol.
3.1 CPIR Technique for Privacy Preserving Range
Queries
We introduce a new approach for privacy preserving range queries by implementing
Private Information Retrieval protocol on an existing range query scheme. The
base scheme for range query is Hore et al.’s [18] bucketization method. In retrieval
operations the new CPIR method described in Chapter 2 is employed. The flow of
the range query protocol can be summarized as follows:
Setup In the setup phase, initially the data is partitioned into buckets according to
the Greedy Multi Partitioning (Algorithm 2) and Controlled Diffusion (Algorithm 3)
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algorithms [18]. The number of buckets are assigned as powers of 8 and 16 to utilize
octal and hexadecimal trees in CPIR. The bucketization algorithms do not guarantee
to create same sized buckets. Thus, once the buckets are generated, some dummy
values are inserted to make them equal in size.
Once the buckets are generated, the next step is to send them to server for
storage. The buckets are stored on leaf nodes of octal and hexadecimal trees. As
the bucket size can be relatively large, generally we need more than one tree to store
the buckets. Thus, they are placed in trees in such a way that each leaf node of a
tree holds one part of each bucket, which means the number of trees is proportional
to the bucket size. Moreover, the size of the trees becomes equal to the number
of buckets, since each leaf node maps to one bucket. Here we assume that the
data within each bucket is encrypted using a secure symmetric cipher algorithm,
therefore, the confidentiality of data is guaranteed.
To exemplify the distribution of a bucket into trees, consider a bucket which
contains 16 items as the result of bucketization algorithms including the addition of
dummy values. Each data item has 5 integer attributes including the primary key
which is equal to 160 bits. Since an encrypted storage is required, the encryption
of an item using AES maps to 256 bit of ciphertext for 160 bit plaintext in 256 bit
block size. If each node of tree can contain 1024 bits of information, then we can
place 4 of the items in a tree. Since we have 16 items in total, we need to distribute
the bucket on 4 trees.
Sending Query To perform a range query operation, first the client needs to
find the buckets which include the requested data range using a query translation
operation. Later, based on the bucket ids, the client needs to prepare the selection
bits to retrieve its content from the server. Since the requested bucket is stored on
the same leaf node in each tree, the selection bits can generated for once and used
on each tree repetitively.
Query Response Based on the selection bits sent by the client, server needs to
perform CPIR on each tree to retrieve the corresponding bucket. In our method,
we utilized the new CPIR method instead of Lipmaa’s original method due to per-
formance reasons. To utilize the parallelism in the best way, when the number of
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trees exceeds the number of available cores, we employed a parallelism on tree level.
Meanly, each tree operates in parallel, but the CPIR operation in trees is operated
serially. Since this case occurs for small tree sizes, such as 8 or 16 nodes for each tree,
the serial usage of CPIR method does not affect performance significantly. On the
other hand, when there are less trees than the core size, the trees are operated seri-
ally while CPIR operations in each tree employ in parallel. The server computations
for CPIR based range query method on octal trees are presented in Algorithm 13.
Algorithm 13 RQ-CPIR: Server computations for CPIR based Range Query on
octal trees
Input E = {e0,0, . . . , ed−1,6} where in es,i s = 1 · · · d, i = 0 · · · 6 and T =
{T1, . . . , Tt}, where t: number of trees, 2κ: number of cores
Output R[1 : t]d,0
. Number of trees per core:
ω = t/2κ
. Number of trees ≥ number of cores
if T ≥ 2κ then
for p← 0 to 2κ − 1 in parallel do
for k ← 1 to ω do




. Number of trees ≤ number of cores
for k ← 1 to t do
R[k]d,0 = OCTO-PARALLEL (E , T [p · ω + k], 2κ)
end for
end if
return R[1 : t]d,0
3.2 Path ORAM Technique for Privacy Preserv-
ing Range Queries
Implementation of Path ORAM for privacy preserving range queries is rather straight-
forward compared to the CPIR model. The method does not require any change
on the server side. The server is only responsible for sending all nodes in the path
of the requested bucket id to the client. Similarly, the client side operations do not
require any fundamental change to the Path ORAM method.
In the setup phase of the method, the binary tree structure on server which stores
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the database is filled with dummy values. To place the data items into binary tree,
client performs repetitive write operations using the access protocol. The properties
of data item are same with CPIR method. Meanly, each item has several attributes
and based on the total size of the item, it is encrypted with AES using a suitable
block size. After each retrieval operation, the data is re-encrypted. To enable
different ciphertext values for the same data item, in each encryption operation
some random values are padded to plaintext.
For query sending step, different from the original algorithm [28], a query pro-
cessing operation is added. Thus, when client wants to search for a range, the query
processor finds the buckets which stores the requested items. Since the query range
can map to several buckets, the client may need to perform more than read operation
to retrieve the items.
Path ORAM method does not require any computation on server side. Thus,
the server is only responsible for sending the path that contains the requested data





The trivial solution to retrieve a data item or a data range from an outsourced
database without leaking any information is to download the entire database and to
perform the query in local. However, for large database sizes, this is not a practical
solution due to excessive bandwidth usage. Instead, using Private Information Re-
trieval or Oblivious RAM methods can enable a more bandwidth-efficient retrieval of
data by preserving its privacy. However, bandwidth usage is an important concern
for both schemes, such that the cost of communication for good PIR and ORAM
schemes should not exceed the cost of the trivial solution. To that end, in this chap-
ter, we first analyze the cost of communication for the new CPIR scheme introduced
in Chapter 2. Since CPIR requires processing each item of the database an analysis
of computation complexity is also provided. Then, the bandwidth requirements of
the new CPIR and the Path ORAM methods in privacy-preserving range queries
are examined. Finally, the computational analysis of two methods are provided.
4.1 Analysis of Communication and Computation
for CPIR
We start our analysis with the cost of communication and computation on the new
CPIR method. In the following section, first the bandwidth requirements for octal
and hexadecimal trees are explained. Later, the bandwidth usage of the scalable
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method on both trees are analyzed. Finally, for the computation cost, the estimated
timings of computations are provided. In the tables of this section, to differentiate
the methods from each other, specific notations are used for server computations.
‘octo-old’ and ‘binary-old’ display the performance on octal and binary trees for
Lipmaa’s CPIR method. ‘binary-new’, ‘octo-new’ and ‘hex-new’ show the timings
for the new CPIR method on binary, octal and hexadecimal trees. Finally, ‘octo-LL’
and ‘hex-LL’ show the timing results of the implementation of Lim-Lee technique
on the new CPIR method for octal and hexadecimal trees.
4.1.1 Analysis of Communication Complexity
The communication complexity of Lipmaa’s CPIR method based on binary decision
diagrams scheme is sub-linear which makes it a promising scheme for PIR. In Bd-
dCPIR, the bandwidth usage is determined by two message exchanges. First one
is sending the encrypted selection bits from client to server and the second one is
the response of server to client as a result of CPIR computations. For a database
with n files, the number of selection bits is log2 n. At the lowest level of the binary
tree, when the modulus is N , the size of the encrypted selection bit is 2|N | due to
message expansion in encryption, where |N | = dlog2(N)e. On the next level, the
size increases to 3|N | and at the root, it is equal to (log2n+ 1) · |N |. Thus, the total
size of the encrypted selection bits sent from client to the server is:
[2 + 3 + · · ·+ (log2 n+ 1)] · |N |
After completing CPIR computations using the encrypted selection bits, the
server sends a response of size (log2n+ 1) · |N |.
The bandwidth usage in octal and hexadecimal trees can be computed similarly.
In octal trees, for each level of the tree 7 encrypted selection bits need to be sent
by the client while for hexadecimal trees it is equal to 15. Since the depth of the
trees are log8n and log16n respectively, the total amount of bits sent to server can
be formulated as follows:
Octal : [7 · (2 + 3 + · · ·+ (log8 n+ 1))] · |N |
Hexadecimal : [15 · (2 + 3 + · · ·+ (log16 n+ 1))] · |N |
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The response of the server is (log8 n+1)·|N | for octal method and (log16 n+1)·|N |
for hexadecimal method. Based on these formulations, Table 4.1 demonstrates the
total bandwidth usage for various database sizes, when |N | = 1024. From the values
in Table 4.1, it is not immediate to identify the best scheme. For smaller datasets,
binary tree implementation is advantageous. However, when database size is larger
than 4096 items, the communication cost of the octal case becomes advantegous.
Hexadecimal tree has the maximum bandwidth usage, but the computational cost
of hexadecimal tree can balance its higher bandwidth usage.
n Database size binary octal hex
2 2048 4096 - -
4 4096 8192 - -
8 8192 13312 16384 -
16 16384 19456 - 32768
32 32768 26624 - -
64 65536 34816 38912 -
128 131072 44032 - -
256 262144 54272 - 79872
512 524288 65536 68608 -
1024 1048576 77824 - -
2048 2097152 91136 - -
4096 4194304 105472 105472 142336
8192 8388608 120832 - -
16384 16777216 137216 - -
32768 33554432 154624 149504 -
65536 67108864 173056 - 220160
131072 134217728 192512 - -
262144 268435456 212992 200704 -
524288 536870912 234496 - -
1048576 1073741824 257024 - 313344
2097152 2147483648 280576 259072 -
Table 4.1: The total bandwidth usage in number of bits for changing database sizes,
where dlog2(N)e = 1024
Bandwidth Usage In Scalable CPIR
The scalable approach requires to send additional selection bits for the subtrees,
which adds an overhead in bandwidth usage. In [30] the number of bits sent from
client to server in scalable case is formulated as
(2µ+ (2g − 1) · (3 + 4 + · · ·+ (l + 2)))|N |
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where l is the depth of the subtree, µ = 2m−y·l is the number of subtrees, while 2m
is equal to the number of items in original tree. Also, g is the number of encrypted
selection bits prepared by client for each level which is 1, 3, and 4 for binary, octal,
and hexadecimal trees, respectively. Depending on the tree used, namely binary,
octal, or hexadecimal, y also becomes 1, 3 and 4, respectively. Finally N is the
modulus of Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem. Different from the normal case, the size
of the response sent from server to the client is (l + 2) · |N |.
The costs of overall communication in scalable case for octal and hexadecimal
trees are presented in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. Accordingly, smaller
subtree sizes have significantly greater bandwidth requirements. On the other hand,
the advantage of small subtrees in computational cost, as showed in Chapter 5,
causes a trade off for the optimal subtree size in the scalable method.














Table 4.2: Total bandwidth usage in scalable CPIR for octal trees (number of bits),
where dlog2(N)e = 1024
2m Database size l Bandwidth usage









Table 4.3: Total bandwidth usage in scalable CPIR for hexadecimal trees (number
of bits), where dlog2(N)e = 1024
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4.1.2 Analysis of Computational Complexity
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis to show the improvement in CPIR
computations by the improvements presented in Chapter 2. For calculations of
estimated timing results of the new scheme, we adopted the formulations given
in [30].
Since the computations are dominated by modular exponentiation operations, we
measured the time spent for one exponentiation on different levels of the tree which
is represented as τs, where s indicates the level of the tree. In the original CPIR
each node requires 3 modular exponentiations for the binary tree and 9 modular
exponentiation for the octal tree. Then the total time spent for one node is tbs = 3 ·τs
and tos = 9 · τs [30]. However, in the new CPIR scheme, since the number of
exponentiations are reduced by one for each node, the total time becomes tbs = 2 · τs,
tos = 8 · τs and ths = 16 · τs for binary, octal and hexadecimal trees, respectively. For
the sink nodes, the time should be calculated as tb1 = τs, t
o
1 = 7 · τs and th1 = 15 · τs.
Based on this information and using the derivations of [30], we can compute the















m−1th1 for m ≥ 1. (4.1)
Similar to this formulation, to compute estimated timing values of the Lim-Lee
extension, we measured the time spent for the Lim-Lee operation in each level of the
tree, which is represented as τLLs . Using this measurement, we compute the total










16m−sτLLs for m ≥ 1 (4.2)
Using these formulas, the estimated cost of computation for several data sizes is




old new old new LL old new LL
2 4 1 - - - - - -
4 26 15 - - - - - -
8 98 60 13 10 5 - - -
16 280 175 - - - 24 21 7
32 703 446 - - - - - -
64 1625 1039 155 126 50 - - -
128 3560 2284 - - - - - -
256 7549 4853 - - - 483 432 125
512 15670 10088 1373 1131 432 - - -
1024 32069 20663 - - - - - -
2048 65057 41938 - - - - - -
4096 131248 84631 11239 9274 3526 7980 7152 2036
8192 263884 170188 - - - - - -
16384 529436 341489 - - - - - -
32768 1060856 684300 90346 74573 28333 - - -
65536 2124015 1370135 - - - 128153 114880 32654
Table 4.4: Estimated timings of server side computations for different tree types in
ms, where |N | = 1024
In our method, we improved the performance of the CPIR scheme by utilizing
parallel algorithms. Therefore, in theoretical analysis, the effect of parallelism on
the new CPIR method is observed. Based on the equations provided in [30], the
computation cost of the new CPIR model on binary trees can be computed by
following equation:
T p2m = T2σ +
m∑
s=σ+1




m− κ m ≥ κ0 otherwise.
In Equation 4.3, 2κ is the number of cores where m ≥ κ ≥ 0. Based on this equation,
Table 4.5 shows the calculated timing values for CPIR on binary trees.
n
Number of Cores
4 8 16 32
binary
old
64 449 275 205 180
128 952 552 378 308
256 1974 1095 695 521
512 4037 2165 1286 886
4096 33059 16840 8858 4964
binary
new
64 296 209 179 171
128 622 399 312 282
256 1285 765 542 455
512 2618 1668 956 733
4096 21347 11395 5971 3545
Table 4.5: Estimated timing values for binary trees in ms
In an octal tree implementation where the number of items in database is 8m,
c is the number of cores and λ = dlog8 ce, the formula for estimated timing of the
















m− λ m ≥ λ0 otherwise.
Using Equation 4.4, estimated timing values for various database sizes on octal
trees are demonstrated in Table 4.6.
Similar to octal case, in hexadecimal tree implementation for a database of 16m
items and c cores,λ = dlog16 ce. Based on these values, the timings can be calculated
using Equation 4.5. Table 4.7 presents the estimated cost of server computations on

















4 8 16 32
octo
old
64 43 25 13 10
512 355 185 95 58
4096 2831 1429 722 383
octo
new
64 32 16 12 9
512 283 141 78 47
4096 2318 1159 594 311
Table 4.6: Estimated timing values for octal trees in ms
where
σ =
m− λ m ≥ λ0 otherwise.
n
Number of Cores
4 8 16 32
256 108 54 27 17
4096 1788 894 447 231
Table 4.7: Estimated timing values for hexadecimal trees in ms
4.2 Analysis of Communication and Computation
for Privacy Preserving Range Queries
Both Path ORAM and CPIR guarantees the security of privacy-preserving range
queries by guaranteeing data confidentiality, query confidentiality and hiding the
query access patterns. However, the performance of the two methods differs in
terms of efficiency, which is a crucial aspect for any application over outsourced
data. Hence, the rest of this section provides a qualitative comparison of CPIR and
Path ORAM methods in terms of bandwidth usage and computation cost.
CPIR technique for Privacy Preserving Range Queries: The proposed
model for privacy preserving range queries using Private Information Retrieval meth-
ods requires employing computations on multiple trees. Although the proposed
method achieves good performance results, the size of communication is an impor-
tant issue for the efficiency of the model which requires a detailed inspection of
bandwidth requirements.
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In our model, two message exchanges determine the cost of communication. First
one is sending the selection bits prepared on client side to server side. Although there
are multiple trees, since in each tree the corresponding nodes preserve the order of
buckets, generating the selection bits only for one tree and applying them repetitively
on each tree can provide the intended selection. However, the size of the selection
bits is still an important issue to decide the optimal bucket size for changing database
sizes. Furthermore, the size of the server response is determined by the number of
trees, since each tree computes a response for the corresponding bucket. Therefore,
the server response needs to be multiplied by the number of trees to compute the
total bandwidth usage. Section 4.1 provides a detailed analysis on the calculation of
the number of bits exchanged for octal and hexadecimal trees in the CPIR method.
Based on the provided calculation methods, an analysis of bandwidth usage in CPIR
scheme is presented on Figure 4.1 for octal and hexadecimal tree implementations
to retrieve one bucket. Since the bandwidth usage of a good CPIR scheme needs to
be less than the size of the database, the plots demonstrate the ratio of exchanged
bits to database size with respect to increasing database size. The results suggest
that increasing database size favors using more buckets.























10-1 64 buckets - octoCPIR
512 buckets - octoCPIR
4096 buckets - octoCPIR
256 buckets - hexCPIR
4096 buckets - hexCPIR
Figure 4.1: Ratio of exchanged bits to database size in CPIR based technique on
octal and hexadecimal trees for different number of buckets
Path ORAM technique for Privacy Preserving Range Queries: While
Path ORAM is a simple and fast method for the retrieval of encrypted data, since
the method requires repetitive path reading and writing, a careful construction is
required to optimize the bandwidth usage. Similar to CPIR, the bandwidth usage
is determined by two messages. The first one is reading the path of the intended
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bucket from the database, which requires server to send Z log T blocks, where Z is
the number of blocks within each bucket, T is the number of buckets and logT is the
length of the path from the retrieved node to the root node. The second message
is writing the accessed path back to tree, which requires to send Z log T blocks of
data back to the server, as well. Therefore, the total cost of communication for Path
ORAM can be summarized as 2Z log T . In computations of the bandwidth usage,
Z is fixed to 4 to keep in line with original Path ORAM method [28]. Since the size
of a block is determined by the number of data items assigned into it, the size of the
data item is important for bandwidth computations. In our analysis, each data item
is considered as a tuple with 5 integer attributes stored including the primary key.
Since each integer is 32-bit, the total size of a tuple becomes 160 bits. Furthermore,
the data needs to be stored in encrypted form. Using AES encryption, a 160 bit
plaintext value maps to 256 bit ciphertext because of the block size of encryption.
Based on the above explanations, the bandwidth usage in Path ORAM method
is presented in Figure 4.2 along with CPIR technique. For compatibility of CPIR
and Path ORAM method, the number of buckets utilized in Path ORAM is selected
close to the number of buckets in CPIR. Similar to CPIR, a higher number of buckets
is advantageous in terms of bandwidth usage for large database sizes.

























63 buckets - ORAM
255 buckets - ORAM
511 buckets - ORAM
4095 buckets - ORAM
Figure 4.2: Ratio of exchanged bits to database size in Path ORAM based technique
for different number of buckets
Based on Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, a comparison between CPIR and Path
ORAM technique can be made. The results show that as database size increases,
the decline of the ratio for bandwidth usage in the CPIR based method is clear for
the same number of buckets. An important issue in the provided analyses is that
45
they demonstrate bandwidth usage to retrieve one bucket from the trees. However,
querying for a range may require to retrieve more than one buckets. Especially,
utilizing a method to introduce false positives in buckets for privacy concerns, which
is Controlled Diffusion mechanism in our case, causes the increase of the number of
retrieved buckets for range queries. Thus, in Figure 4.3, an analysis of the bandwidth
usage in CPIR and Path ORAM based range query scheme for increasing number
of buckets is presented. In figure, the bandwidth usage is represented as the ratio of
exchanged bits to database size. To compare the performance of hexadecimal and
octal tree implementation of CPIR, the results are provided separately for the two
implementations. According to the results, there is not a significant difference in
bandwidth consumption between octal tree and hexadecimal tree CPIR technique
for increasing number of buckets. However, the bandwidth usage of the Path ORAM
based technique clearly are much higher compared to the CPIR methods.
Number of Buckets





























Figure 4.3: The bandwidth usage in the CPIR and ORAM method to retrieve
multiple buckets
4.2.1 Computational Complexity Analysis
Apart from the simplicity of implementation, Path ORAM is a fast method in
encrypted data retrieval; since the server does not perform any further computation,
but only returns the requested path to the client. Therefore, there is no burden on
the server in terms of computational complexity. The cost of computation on the
client side for one access is O(logK) · ω(1), where K is the number of total blocks
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outsourced to the server. The cost contains decryption, shuﬄing and re-encryption
operations on log(K) blocks in each access.
On the other hand, Lipmaa’s CPIR requires O(n) computation cost on server
side and O(log2n) computation cost on client side. Furthermore, since each bucket
is partitioned into several trees, the cost of computation on the server side will
be increased by a constant magnitude. However, although in terms of asymptotic
complexity CPIR scheme is slower, by changing the structure of the tree and adding
parallelism into the implementation [30], CPIR can be a practical scheme for privacy
preserving range queries.
Based on the analysis of communication and computation, in terms of asymptotic
complexity, Path ORAM gives better results. However carefully selection of bucket
sizes and utilizing parallellization techniques makes CPIR a practical scheme for
range queries, as well. Apart from the concerns of bandwidth and computation
performance, the requirement of additional storage, the private stash, on the client
side makes Path ORAM less advantageous against CPIR. On the CPIR method, the
client does not need a storage but only responsible for computation of encrypted
selection bits once. The encrypted selection bits can be used on each tree on the
server side without a re-computation. Furthermore, the existence of a private stash
may create difficulties in a multi-client scenario. It requires a separate stash for each
client. When a client performs a read or write operation, he needs to write back the
retrieved items to a new path. Thus, in each access operation, the clients need to
inform each other for the new locations, which causes additional cost on operations.
On the other hand, a multi-client implementation of CPIR scheme does not affect




To show the correctness of the improvements on the BddCPIR method, all of the
proposed schemes, serial, parallel, Lim-Lee technique and scalable technique, are
implemented. Furthermore, these schemes adapted to range query scheme to com-
pare its performance with Path ORAM. The programming language used for all
implementations is C++. For big integer operations GMP, The GNU Multiple Pre-
cision Arithmetic Library, is utilized. Parallel operations are handled by OpenMP
API. The experiments are employed on two different computers. The first machine
runs 64 bit Ubuntu 12.04 operating system. It is a 6-core platform where each core
is an Intel Xeon CPU E5-1650 v2 operating at 3.50 GHz. We used 4 of the cores
in the experiments which show the improvements on the BddCPIR method. The
second machine has 64 bit CentOS 6.5 as operating system. It has 30 cores where
each one is an Intel Xeon CPU E7-4870 v2 operating at 2.30 GHz. This machine is
utilized to show the scalability of the new CPIR scheme on large database sizes and
to compare the performance of CPIR and Path ORAM.
5.1 Timing results for the new CPIR
The implementation includes binary, octal and hexadecimal approaches for the new
CPIR method. The experiments for the usage of the Lim-Lee technique is only
applied on octal and hexadecimal trees. For the scalable method, the results of the
new CPIR method and the new method with Lim-Lee technique are demonstrated
separately. To show the improvement in performance the results on binary and
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octal trees for the original method [30] are included in each table. To clarify the
notation in tables for server computations, ‘octo-old’ and ‘binary-old’ display the
performance on octal and binary trees for Lipmaa’s CPIR method. ‘binary-new’,
‘octo-new’ and ‘hex-new’ show the timings for the new CPIR method on binary, octal
and hexadecimal trees. Finally, ‘octo-LL’ and ‘hex-LL’ show the timing results of
the implementation of Lim-Lee technique on the new CPIR method for octal and
hexadecimal trees.
The proposed methods in this work change the computations on the server side,
but the computations on client side is the same as the original method. Therefore,
the performance measurements for the client side operations are categorized based
on the type of the tree used in implementation, as binary, octal and hexadecimal.
5.1.1 Timings for Client Side Computations
On the client side, two operations are important in measuring the performance of
the CPIR. These are encryption of the selection bits and iterative decryption of
server response. As proposed in Section 2.5, the encryptions are performed using
parallel algorithms. Since decryption operations are dependent on each other, it is
performed serially.
The timings for the client operations of CPIR on binary, octal and hexadecimal
trees for various data sizes are presented in Table 5.1. The results show that the
message expansion property of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem benefits shallower
trees in encryption and decryption operations. Namely, increasing the number of
items in database, hexadecimal tree has the best performance results and octal tree,
obviously, performs better than binary tree implementation.
5.1.2 Timings for Server Side Computations
The server operations are the dominant part of the CPIR method in terms of per-
formance since it requires employment on each file of the database. However, this
performance drawback can be handled by utilization of parallel methods in imple-
mentation. The CPIR method is suitable for parallelism since it involves repetitive
independent operations. In our experiments, we tested the proposed CPIR method




Client Encryption (ms) Client Decryption (ms)
binary octo hex binary octo hex
2 2 - - 2 - -
4 7 - - 5 - -
8 19 5 - 11 2 -
16 34 - 8 19 - 2
32 55 - - 30 - -
64 78 19 - 41 5 -
128 114 - - 58 - -
256 151 - 40 78 - 5
512 200 48 - 102 10 -
1024 257 - - 130 - -
2048 324 - - 163 - -
4096 416 93 93 200 18 10
32768 - 197 - - 28 -
65536 - - 176 - - 18
Table 5.1: Timings of client computation for encryption of selection bits and de-
cryption of results with |N | = 1024
the change in performance by increasing the number of cores.
Serial Case
In the experiments, we first tested the performance of the new method with the
original BddCPIR method. Since the original scheme is a serial implementation,
Table 5.2 lists the timing values without utilizing any parallel method. Since the
message size increases in each level, the performance of binary tree implementation
becomes prohibitively poor for large data sizes. On the other hand, octal and
hexadecimal trees gain significant advantage on the original BddCPIR scheme.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, another dominant factor on the performance of CPIR
is the number of exponentiation operations. Comparing the values of ‘binary-old’
and ‘binary-new’ in Table 5.2, we can observe the improvement by reducing the
number of exponentiations. Furthermore, the effect of simultaneous exponentiation
in computation time by utilization of the Lim-Lee multi-exponentiation algorithm is
apparent in timings. For example, in octal case a speed up of 96, 808/35, 691 = 2.71
is achieved for a database with 4096 files compared to the performance of Lipmaa’s
CPIR method on octal trees.
The overall change in the performance by usage of shallow trees and the new
CPIR method is remarkable. For a database size of 4096, while BddCPIR method’s
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cost is 135249 ms, the hexadecimal tree implementation by utilizing Lim-Lee multi-
exponentiation has a cost of 2002 ms which is equal to 68 times acceleration.
No of.
items
Server Computations - Serial (ms)
binary-new binary-old octo-LL octo-new octo-old hex-LL hex-new
2 2 5 - - - - -
4 16 28 - - - - -
8 62 102 5 11 16 - -
16 181 292 - - - 7 25
32 460 730 - - - - -
64 1,067 1,682 61 135 182 - -
128 2,358 3,683 - - - - -
256 4,999 7,786 - - - 128 484
512 10,359 16,167 535 1,205 1,580 - -
1,024 21,260 33,053 - - - - -
2,048 43,124 67,141 - - - - -
4,096 87,111 135,249 4,368 9,869 12,052 2,002 7,703
32,768 - - 35,691 79,484 96,808 - -
65,536 - - - - - 32,385 123,540
Table 5.2: Timings of server computation in serial case for binary, octal and hex-
adecimal trees with |N | = 1024
Parallel Case
The structure of CPIR algorithms is suitable to employ computations in parallel.
Therefore, using the parallel algorithms defined in Section 2.5, we utilized parallelism
on the new CPIR method. As the results of Table 5.3 imply, parallel algorithms
do not only benefit the new CPIR method, but it also improves the original Bdd-
CPIR method. Especially for larger databases, the effect of parallel implementation
against serial implementation is obvious. For example, in a database with 64 files,
the speedup of the parallel implementation of the new CPIR method using octal
trees (octo-new) over its serial implementation is approximately 135 / 47 = 2.87.
However, when the number of items in database are increased to 4096, the acceler-
ation increases up to 9,869 / 2,603 = 3.79.
As the actual timing results show, adding parallelism into the new CPIR method
makes it a more feasible scheme compared to Lipmaa’s BddCPIR scheme. To sup-
port this claim we can analyze the performance of the BddCPIR and the new CPIR
on hexadecimal tree by utilizing multi-exponentiation technique. It requires 135249
ms to complete computations of 4096 files for BddCPIR in serial computation while
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the new CPIR on hexadecimal tree can finish it in 573 ms, which is equal to an
improvement by 135249 / 573 = 236, approximately.
No of.
items
Server Computations - Parallel (ms)
binary-new binary-old octo-LL octo-new octo-old hex-LL hex-new
2 2 5 - - - - -
4 13 23 - - - - -
8 34 61 6 4 6 - -
16 84 138 - - - 7 8
32 164 289 - - - - -
64 338 566 35 47 58 - -
128 676 1,138 - - - - -
256 1,390 2,282 - - - 56 139
512 2,814 4,551 186 329 407 - -
1,024 5,689 9,063 - - - - -
2,048 11,444 18,076 - - - - -
4,096 22,938 36,039 1,219 2,603 3,199 573 2,031
32,768 - - 9,336 20,817 25,409 - -
65,536 - - - - - 8,448 32,370
Table 5.3: Timings of server computation in parallel case for octal and hexadecimal
trees
Scalable Case
For larger data sizes, we conducted experiments using the scalable approach for
CPIR proposed in Section 2.6. To compare the performance of octal and hexadeci-
mal trees we used a database of 4096 files with subtree sizes 8, 64 and 512 for octal
and 16 and 256 for hexadecimal case. Furthermore, to observe larger data sizes,
we tested databases with 32768 and 65536 files for octal and hexadecimal trees








64 799 1,755 1,803
512 1,256 2,688 2,956
32768
64 5,588 13,146 13,259
512 6,048 14,127 13,347
4096 9,324 21,534 23,528
Table 5.4: Timings of server computation in scalable case for octal trees
Analyses of Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 suggest that when the size of subtree is















Table 5.5: Timings of server computation in scalable case for hexadecimal trees
size gets small, the number of subtrees increases which adversely affects the band-
width of the scheme. Another important issue in scalable case is the performance of
the new CPIR with Lim-Lee multi exponentiation method. Applying Lim-Lee’s tech-
nique in subtree collapsing operations improves the performance of scalable method
significantly. Using Lim-Lee’s method, the performance of the new CPIR method
in octal trees for 4096 files is improved by 2956 / 1256 = 2.35 times approximately.
The speed up value increases to 2094 / 567 = 3.69, when the method is implemented
on hexadecimal trees for the same database size.
Timings on 30-Core Computer Platform
Finally, in order to demonstrate the scalability of the new CPIR scheme on large
database sizes, we conducted experiments on a machine which utilizes 30 cores. The
observations include both the parallel and scalable approaches of the new CPIR on
octal and hexadecimal trees. Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 list the timings of parallel
implementation for various number of cores. The improvement in timings are in line
with the change in the number of cores. For example, in Table 5.6 for 32768 items,
the computation time of the new CPIR method utilizing Lim-Lee technique is 49671
ms for 1 core. When the number of cores doubled, the time decreases to 25031 ms,
almost half of the former one. Similarly, for 4 cores, the computation time reduces
to 12656 ms which is again half of the result with 2 cores. Table 5.8 and Table 5.9
show the results of computations for the scalable method on octal and hexadecimal










































8 7 15 19 7 8 11 7 4 6 7 3 4 7 3 4 7 3 4
64 85 190 234 57 95 121 42 47 65 35 24 37 35 27 52 35 27 53
512 748 1,692 2,065 407 847 1,044 237 423 534 152 213 278 123 153 262 123 143 248
4096 6,106 13,880 16,868 3,117 6,938 8,472 1,625 3,471 4,257 878 1,744 2,154 537 980 1,369 447 723 1,117
32768 49,225 111,759 135,738 24,630 55,584 68,022 12,461 27,800 34,114 6,339 13,927 17,088 3,350 7,204 9,070 2,307 4,697 6,330
262144 * * * 195,484 446,293 542,879 98,421 223,470 271,456 49,372 112,311 136,266 24,919 56,751 68,977 15,910 33,829 44,487
2097152 * * * * * * * * * 400,844 971,242 1091,510 199,177 485,164 555,415 113,385 274,862 317,615




1 2 4 8 16 30
hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL
16 32 9 17 9 8 9 5 9 6 9 6 9
256 653 171 326 102 164 67 82 50 41 43 48 43
4096 10,775 2,818 5,399 1,449 2,708 762 1,359 419 680 250 541 217
65536 173,469 45,241 86,540 22,765 43,510 11,399 21,770 5,794 10,969 2,974 6,696 2,004
1048576 2,752,900 719,958 1,383,160 361,099 697,282 181,716 348,686 90,749 174,412 45,579 101,279 28,561













































64 9.14 9.12 8.98 4.63 4.6 4.52 2.42 2.36 1.05 1.22 1.19 0.56 0.66 0.64 0.33 0.57 0.56 0.29
512 11.88 11.71 10.42 6.02 5.92 5.21 3.96 3.60 1.64 2.01 1.81 0.88 1.28 1.01 0.54 1.07 0.83 0.46
32768
64 70.44 70.62 70.49 35.46 35.36 35.35 17.87 17.72 7.53 8.87 8.86 3.76 4.51 4.48 1.95 3.29 3.02 1.40
512 73.26 73.1 71.65 36.82 36.66 36.05 19.34 19.07 8.16 9.64 9.52 4.12 5.11 4.84 2.17 3.72 3.53 1.62
4096 95.44 93.78 82.75 48.03 47.01 41.03 31.72 28.88 12.52 15.93 14.51 6.37 8.48 7.43 3.36 5.86 5.31 2.51
262144
64 * * * 282.83 280.89 117.44 140.35 140.06 59.55 70.17 70.41 29.57 35.05 35.04 14.82 23.81 23.27 9.77
512 * * * 282.16 283.74 118.47 141.26 142.38 59.91 71.14 71.35 28.88 35.74 35.46 15.08 23.12 23.20 9.74
4096 * * * 293.12 292.90 127.77 153.73 152.92 64.31 77.13 76.06 32.20 39.10 38.89 16.32 26.13 24.16 10.55
32768 * * * 383.80 375.76 197.14 252.98 231.40 98.88 126.65 115.89 49.57 64.14 58.57 25.17 42.93 38.11 16.05







1 2 4 8 16 30
hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL
65536
256 143.75 36.23 70.82 18.17 35.51 9.06 17.85 4.60 8.90 2.35 6.32 1.81
4096 179.86 45.09 89.79 22.40 45.70 11.34 22.59 5.73 11.37 3.00 7.71 2.17
1048576
256 * * * * 558.41 143.05 280.75 71.48 139.79 35.77 94.11 23.42
4096 * * * * 567.29 144.64 284.46 72.30 142.25 36.38 92.14 23.43
65536 * * * * 721.67 180.33 360.36 90.42 180.91 45.43 115.26 29.41
Table 5.9: Timings of server computation in hexadecimal tree with scalable method for various number of cores in sec
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5.2 Timing results for the Privacy Preserving Range
Queries
For the range query experiments, we implemented the new CPIR model both in
serial and parallel versions and the Path ORAM technique based on the algorithm
in [28]. As data set, to keep in line with the experiments of the bucketization
method in [18], the Lineitem table of TPCH benchmark is used [29] which is a
common benchmark for the evaluation of database management systems. Since the
table contains more than 6 million data entries, random subsets of data are created
for experiments. Each data set contains 128, 1024 and 16384 entries respectively.
To evaluate multi-dimensional range queries, four integer attributes of the Lineitem
table - Quantity, Linenumber, ExtendedPrice and Tax- are selected with primary
key PartKey-SuppKey. Further, to apply multi-dimensional range queries, query
sets are generated within the boundaries of each dataset. Since the confidentiality
of data is a requirement in privacy preserving range queries, each data tuple is
encrypted for server storage using AES with 256-bit block size. For the operations
of Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem, 1024-bit modulus is used to provide 80-bit security.
Our first experiment compares the performance of the new CPIR and Path
ORAM in terms of client computation cost. For the CPIR method we measured the
performance on octal and hexadecimal trees by utilizing the new CPIR method and
its Lim-Lee extension. Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 give the measurements of client side
computations for octal and hexadecimal case, respectively. To make Path ORAM
scheme consistent with the CPIR scheme, we tested the schemes on the same bucket
sizes. Considering the current capabilities of a clients machine, in CPIR timings 4
threads are utilized to compute client side operations. The results show the average
time for processing a query. AES encrypt and decrypt operations comprise majority
of computation in Path ORAM. In the CPIR technique, exponentiation of large
numbers during encryption of selection bits and decryption of query response put
burden on computation cost. As the computational analysis of the two techniques
suggests, Path ORAM performs better than CPIR. According to results, in CPIR
method, for large datasets hexadecimal implementation is advantageous. The bet-
ter performance of hexadecimal tree is a result of decryption operations. Meanly,
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for example, for 16384 items with 4096 buckets, octal tree implementation requires
decryption of 512 trees on average while in hexadecimal tree this number is around
256 trees. Therefore, in that case while the total cost of client is 208 ms for octal




8 64 512 4096 7 63 511 4095
128 5 23 - - 0.17 0.20 - -
1024 16 22 62 - 0.52 0.30 0.40 -
16384 208 96 71 129 6.20 2.10 1.00 0.40
Table 5.10: Timings of client computation for CPIR and Path ORAM method in




16 256 4096 15 255 4095
128 9 - - 0.17 - -
1024 13 39 - 0.51 0.30 -
16384 107 53 112 6.40 1.00 0.40
Table 5.11: Timings of client computation for CPIR and Path ORAM method in
hexadecimal case utilizing 4 cores (in ms)
Although the measurements of client side operations are performed on 4 cores
for CPIR method, the development in computation technologies may lead to utilize
computers with more cores for users. Thus, we, also, measured the cost of client
side operations using larger core sizes. The results for encryption and decryption
operations are provided in Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 separately.
The second experiment is based on the cost of the server side operations. Since
the Path ORAM method does not require any computation on server side, we con-
ducted experiments only for the CPIR method. Our measurements include the
timing results for serial and parallel implementation of the new CPIR method on
octal and hexadecimal trees. Table 5.14 and Table 5.15 demonstrate the average
time spent to retrieve one bucket for a query in serial method utilizing octal and
hexadecimal trees in ms, respectively. However, a range query may require to re-
trieve multiple buckets which means spending more time for server side operations.
The results show that while the data size increases, the hexadecimal implementa-
tion gains advantage over the octal tree implementation. Furthermore, usage of the
57
Client Encryption Client Decryption
Number of cores Number of cores
n No. buckets 1 2 4 8 16 1 2 4 8 16
128
8 15 9 4 2 2 9 4 2 2 2
64 76 41 22 11 8 7 7 7 7 7
1024
8 15 9 4 2 2 68 34 17 9 4
64 76 41 22 11 9 27 13 7 7 7
512 227 128 65 32 30 14 14 14 14 14
16384
8 15 9 4 2 2 1099 549 274 138 69
64 76 41 22 11 9 424 213 106 53 27
512 227 128 65 32 30 113 56 28 14 14
4096 512 281 144 73 62 25 25 25 25 25
Table 5.12: Timings of client computation for the CPIR method in octal case uti-
lizing multiple cores (in ms)
Client Encryption Client Decryption
Number of cores Number of Cores
n No. buckets 1 2 4 8 16 1 2 4 8 16
128 16 32 17 9 4 2 4 2 2 2 2
1024
16 32 17 9 4 2 34 17 9 4 2
256 163 85 44 22 11 7 7 7 7 7
16384
16 32 17 9 4 2 549 274 137 69 34
256 163 85 44 22 11 106 53 27 13 7
4096 487 258 130 65 32 17 17 17 15 15
Table 5.13: Timings of client computation for the CPIR method in hexadecimal
case utilizing multiple cores (in ms)
multi-exponentiation algorithm reduces the cost significantly. For example, for a




8 64 512 4096
octo-new octo-LL octo-new octo-LL octo-new octo-LL octo-new octo-LL
128 60 28 189 85 - -
1024 479 227 759 338 1689 743 - -
16384 7656 3647 12117 5425 13518 5944 13819 6067
Table 5.14: Timings of serial server computation for the new CPIR method in octal
case in ms
Table 5.16 and Table 5.17 show the timings for parallel implementation of CPIR
technique to retrieve one bucket on octal and hexadecimal trees, respectively. The
results are similar with serial implementation. Increasing data size benefits hexadec-





hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL
128 64 17 - - - -
1024 513 139 652 172 - -
16384 8192 2245 10457 2760 10781 2823
Table 5.15: Timings of serial server computation for the new CPIR method in
hexadecimal case in ms





1 2 4 8 16
octo-new octo LL octo-new octo-LL octo-new octo-LL octo-new octo-LL octo-new octo-LL
128
8 60 28 30 14 15 7 15 7 15 7
64 189 84 130 56 100 42 85 35 85 35
1024
8 479 227 239 114 120 57 60 29 30 15
64 759 338 379 170 190 85 95 53 65 41
512 1692 743 933 405 554 236 364 152 303 124
16384
8 7678 3649 3827 1827 1916 914 959 454 479 230
64 12204 5149 6071 2712 3043 1358 1519 680 762 341
512 13561 5946 6757 2976 3384 1488 1700 748 942 407
4096 13870 6089 7109 3103 3713 1614 2020 873 1260 537
Table 5.16: Timings of parallel server computation for the new CPIR method in octal case in ms
Number of cores
n No. buckets
1 2 4 8 16
hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL hex-new hex-LL
128 16 64 17 32 9 32 9 32 9 32 9
1024
16 513 140 257 72 129 36 65 19 32 11
256 653 171 396 102 269 67 204 50 173 43
16384
16 8218 2235 4104 1128 2052 574 1026 296 514 156
256 10441 2750 5223 1386 2615 702 1312 353 663 183
4096 10770 2813 5568 1441 2971 757 1658 418 1005 247




To address the problem of hiding query access patterns in privacy preserving range
query scheme, we proposed two methods using PIR and ORAM techniques. Our
methods aim to prevent the disclosure of access patterns, in addition to provid-
ing the confidentiality of data and query. For Private Information Retrieval, we
introduced an improved version of Lipmaa’s BddCPIR. To that end, we propose
a new method which reduces the number of modular exponentiation operations in
each node of the tree. We implemented our CPIR method on octal and hexadeci-
mal trees to utilize shallow trees in implementation. Furthermore we benefit from
a multi-exponentiation algorithm [22] which enables to operate multiplication of
several exponentiation terms simultaneously. The new CPIR method is applied on
an existing scheme based on bucketization method [18] for range query operations.
For ORAM, we adapted Stefanov et al.’s [28] Path ORAM to range query scheme.
We analyzed two methods for the cost of communication and computation. The
results of bandwidth analysis to retrieve one bucket show that for large database
sizes the communication cost of the CPIR method is less than the Path ORAM
method. We analyzed the bandwidth usage for retrieval of multiple buckets, since a
range query may map to more than one bucket. The results of communication for
multiple buckets, also, benefits the usage of CPIR compared to Path ORAM. On
the other hand, in terms of computation cost, although the method we proposed for
CPIR improves the performance of Lipmaa’s BddCPIR scheme significantly, it can-
not make CPIR an advantageous scheme against Path ORAM. While Path ORAM
scheme has insignificant server cost, the cost of computations on server side dom-
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inates the computations in CPIR. Apart from communication and computational
comparison, the qualitative aspects of two methods is, also, important in privacy-
preserving range queries. For example, CPIR method is suitable for multi-client
applications. However, on Path ORAM method utilizing a multi-client application
requires an additional cost to inform each client for each access to database due to
the change in data path.
In conclusion, depending on the bandwidth usage and the qualitative aspects,
CPIR based privacy-preserving range query scheme is more advantageous than Path
ORAM based privacy-preserving range query scheme for hiding query access pat-
terns. However, in terms of computational cost, CPIR is still an expensive scheme
compared to Path ORAM.
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